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UP FRONT
The Wall Comes Down
I n the summer 1961, I was serving as  a  C O T C  off icer  wi th  the  
8th  Canadian Hussars, part of 
Canada's brigade with forces of 
the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. It was a summer of 
political and military tensions. 
Warsaw Pact forces were aggressively 
carrying out summer manceuvres 
close to the West German border on 
the Luneburg Heath (where 
Montgomery received the German 
surrender at the end of the Second 
World War) near Hamburg. And, 
despite the denials of Walter Ulbricht 
in June, construction of the Wall in 
the already divided city of Berlin 
began in August.
We were to be given a few days' 
leave during our summer deploy-
ment, and, in common with most of 
my friends, I intended to take that 
leave in Berlin. I like to think that 
desire was driven by a wish to view 
history in the making, but it is possi-
ble that a peek at the Soviet zone 
would have been quickly superceded 
by exploration of the more worldly 
delights of the fabled Kiirfursten-
damm. It was not to be. No doubt 
partly to ensure that there would be 
no inadvertent incidents to exacerbate 
the tension, all recreational and non-
essential military travel to Berlin was 
cancelled for the duration of my stay.
Fast forward to November 1989. 
The Wall had been breached on 10 
November, and by happenstance, as 
chief  of  the Canadian Securi ty 
Intelligence Service, I was to visit my 
German colleagues near Munich the 
following week. Our talks naturally 
focused on the recent events in Berlin 
and what would happen next - any-
body's guess is my recollection. In 
fact, I think my German counterparts
were as surprised as the rest of us that 
the East German regime was crum-
bling as quickly as it clearly was! But 
the most important aspect of this visit 
to Pullach was my hosts' invitation to 
spend the following weekend in 
Berlin, an invitation I accepted with 
alacrity.
Twenty-eight years on, I was final-
ly in Berlin. And what an explosion 
of images from the roller coaster of 
German history lay in store. First 
stop, the bridge over the Glienike 
Brucke. You've all seen it, either in 
films or on the news. It was the tradi-
tional crossing point, usually in the 
wee hours of a dark and misty morn-
ing, when captured intelligence 
agents would be exchanged, in fic-
Lion and in reality. What a contrast 
was that  morning in November 
1989. The sun shone as the crowds 
came to see the nose-to-tail parade of 
shabby little Trabants, uniformly 
belching black smoke on their way 
across yesterday's forbidden border. 
The little cars were met along the 
way by young West Berliners - too 
young to remember the events that 
led to Europe's division for forty 
years - giving a carnation to the occu-
pants of each auto. It was an intense-
ly emotional moment, full of hope 
for the future.
From this emotional high, we 
plunged deep into one of the troughs 
of Germany's history - the suburb of 
Grossen-Wannsee, site of the Wan-
nsee conference where, over a con-
vivial lunch, fifteen senior Nazis plot-
ted and named that most infamous of 
actions - the 'Final Solution' of the `
Jewish Question.' The building itself, 
large but unexceptional, was empty 
and as grey as the waters of the 
Wannsee that lapped the shore. I 
remember feeling nothing but a pro-
found emptiness and how little I 
could say in comment to my hosts.
From there to the courtyard of the 
old War Ministry in the Bendler-
strasse, now a memorial, where von 
Stauffenberg and a few other leaders 
in the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler 
had been summarily executed that 
very night. A dignified setting and a 
sober reminder that even at a late 
stage there were those who put their 
lives on the line to remove the dictator 
who was still obsessed with the war's 
continuation.
And then, to the Wall itself, down a 
road bordered on both sides by the 
Wall to an isolated enclave of West
Fast forward to November 1989. The Wall 
had been breached on 10 November, and by 
happenstance I was to visit my German 
colleagues near Munich the following week. 
Our talks naturally focused on the recent 
events in Berlin and what would happen next 
- anybody's guess is my recollection
"Attention - you are now leaving West 
Berlin"
Berlin. At this section of the Wall and 
its killing ground behind, the East 
German guards clearly believed it was 
still business as usual. Patrols and dogs 
walked this stretch, as if all the cata-
clysmic developments of the past 
week had never happened. All this 
was glimpsed through small holes in 
the Wall 's  crumbling concrete.  
Chilling.
Downtown then, past Checkpoint 
Charlie, that other favourite crossing 
point for Le Carre's and Deighten's 
characters, and on to the Potsdamer 
Platz where we gazed across the Wall 
at the low mound under which lay 
Hitler's bunker and final refuge. 
Here the atmosphere was anything 
but business as usual. Rather a holi-
day atmosphere prevailed, with 
crowds of West Berliners walking 
and talking, many equipped with
hammers to extract their chunk of the 
Wall.
Here the East German guards 
seemed more bemused than anything 
else. A few shouted half-hearted 
warnings to the concrete hunters but 
took no further action. Some made 
monosyllabic replies to the comments 
addressed to them by Western sight-
seers, but most simply stood atop the 
Wall, silent and clearly unsure of what 
was happening around them. Mostly 
young, it was difficult to match these 
youths with those we had just seen 
patrolling with their dogs. Or with 
the ruthless killers of record, whose 
targets (100 plus) are commemorated 
with wreaths and plaques at the spots 
along the length of the Wall where 
they had attempted to cross.
My last image. Walking down the 
Ku'damm, past the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Gedachtniskirche, that mute symbol 
to the horrors of war, in company 
with thousands upon thousands of
Berliners from both sides. And, amaz-
ingly, to hear voices singing 'The 
Battle Hymn of the Republic.' Odd. 
That aside, the amazement of the 
East Berliners at the unremitting opu-
lence of this jewel of capitalism was 
palpable. For example, one could not 
even approach the Mercedes show-
room for the crowds. And a welcome 
for easterners everywhere, fueled by a 
handout on crossing of 50 West 
German marks. For many, a goodly 
portion of the DM 50 was left with 
the pub and bar owners of West 
Berlin, even though they provided 
virtually free drinks to anyone who 
could show they came from across the 
Wall. For many others, however, our 
observation was that perfume and 
fresh fruit were high on the shopping 
lists.
This most remarkable weekend of 
contradictions is perhaps best epito-
mized by the two performances we 
attended. One night we went to the 
Volksoper (the real opera house being 
in East Berlin) to see Gounod's 
`Faust.' On that day in Berlin, who 
was the Devil and whose soul was on 
the auction block? The second night 
we saw a thoroughly incomprehensi-
ble German musical involving Pepsi 
Cola's European manager, the social 
shenanigans of his family, and a full 
sized helicopter that arrived on stage a 
la Miss Saigon. Go figure.
Reid Morden was director of the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
from 1987 to 1991 and deputy minis-
ter of foreign affairs between 1991 
and 1994.
ACHTUAT
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COVERSTORY
Ten Years After: Whatever Happened
to the 'German Problem'?
There is no longer a 'German problem' in global terms, although 
there are and will always be German problems. What are these 
problems, and how might they affect domestic, continental, and 
international security?
B Y  D A V I D  G .  H A G L U N D
Two historical events have recently been celebrated: the 10th anniversary of the breaching of the Berlin Wall and the dawning of a new 
millennium. These are fitting occasions to reflect upon 
one of the core security challenges of the past hundred 
years, namely the so-called German problem in 
international relations. It is not difficult to understand 
Germany's central place in European and, by 
extension, international security as the 20th century began. 
It is, however, difficult to the point of being impossible to 
make a claim for exceptional German significance in 
global security as the 21st century begins. Today, it might 
even be said that what is noteworthy about Germany as a 
geopolitical actor is that it is not particularly noteworthy. 
Whatever happened to the German problem of yore?
At the start of the 20th century, Germany was one of the 
principal 'revisionist' states in a world characterized much 
more than today's by rivalry and even power-balancing 
competition among several major powers. Moreover, and 
most important, it was a discontented power on a conti-
nent, Europe, that had yet to learn how to avoid civil war. 
Today, Germany is a decidedly status quo state in a world 
that has been spared for some decades the less salubrious 
aspects of multipolarity.
At the outset, it is necessary to be clear about what is 
meant by the German problem in international relations.
At the risk of oversimplification, I shall argue that there 
have been only two chief ways of interpreting the phe-
nomenon.' The first tends to be the province of specialists 
in German politics and history who draw on the crucial 
but difficult notion of 'political culture' to generate a set of 
hypotheses based upon a belief in German historical, polit-
ical, and cultural uniqueness. The second group is found 
among the international relations theorists who focus far 
less on whatever may set the Germans apart as a people (or 
as a society), and ask instead what it is about Germany's `
geostrategic' situation, in particular its power and its loca-
tion, that made it such an important factor in internation-
al relations during the past century.
Analysts in the first school tend to argue that Germans -
singly and collectively - ultimately constitute the nub of 
the German problem. Writers in the second school, in con-
trast, de-emphasize the significance of political culture and 
national character - even assuming such could be identi-
fied - and focus instead on power, interests, and place in 
seeking to come to grips with the problem. The approach 
I take here borrows from both, but probably owes more to 
the second than to the first school. I would not wish to
Hundreds of Berliners atop the Berlin Wall, demanding that the wall be 
pulled down, and carving out chunks of concrete for souvenirs
CF' Archives/Lutz Schmidt
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claim that 'political culture' is a specious variable; I say 
only that it is difficult to operationalize.
It can also be controversial, and usually is, as revealed by 
the debate a few years ago over a book published by a 
Harvard professor. In Hitler's Willing Executioners: 
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Daniel Goldhagen 
claimed that it was the German national character, steeped 
in anti-semitism, more than the German political system (
that is, Nazism) that accounted for the Holocaust. As for 
how we should think about Germany and global security 
as we enter the 21st century, this variant of the political-
Despite the welter of publications 
that followed on the heels of 
German unification and were 
concerned with the ultimate 
meaning of the newer, ostensibly `
stronger,' Germany for European 
and international security, it soon 
appeared that the real problem 
was going to be Germany's 
weakness, not its strength.
culture argument offers grounds for concern because it can 
lead to the conclusion that Germans are no different now 
than they were 60 years ago - or, as one letter to the editor 
of the International Herald Tribune put it during the early 
stages of the Goldhagen debate, 'there are no compelling 
reasons to believe they are not that way today.' The same 
writer continued, rather ominously: the 'character of a 
nation, like that of an individual, is revealed in adversity.'2
Of course, not all political-culture arguments lead to the 
conclusion that Germans are iniquitous and therefore in 
need of careful watching; indeed, some claim the opposite, 
namely that the identity of Germans has been so altered 
that they stand out by dint of their moral superiority. For 
example, during the Gulf War the German public initially 
defied the Western consensus on the need to resist Saddam
Hussein's aggression against Kuwait; it counted itself 
almost too upstanding to fight. To those analysts, Germans 
have had war beaten out of their system (and, to some, 
their genes), and, unlike their forbearers, they now bestride 
the planet as its pre-eminent pacifists.
If political culture can lead in any number of directions, 
analysts in the second camp - who stress power, interests, 
and strategic location - can themselves be deeply divided 
on the nature of the German problem today. Unlike their 
counterparts in the subdiscipline of comparative politics, 
theorists of international relations who examine Germany 
tend to eschew political-cultural explanations - at least 
they try to arrive at answers to their questions with mini-
mal reliance on such explanations. Instead, they 
concentrate on 'structural' and other 'institutional' features 
of the international environment.' That said, they can be 
every bit as disputatious as their comparative politics 
cousins, and, on the broad issue of war and peace, the 
international relations theorists effortlessly divide 
between the pessimists and the optimists. On the 
specific issue of Germany and the question of war and 
peace, they divide further into those who believe Germany 
is too strong (and either celebrate or fret about this) and 
those who think it is too weak (and worry or exult 
accordingly).
The dominant view today is reasonably optimistic, cer-
tainly when put in historical perspective. (Indeed, how 
could it not be, in that perspective?) The reasons are varied 
and have to do with. both international and domestic 
structures or 'systems.' Quite irrespective of whether 
Germans are better or worse than any other people, the 
optimists believe that Germany cannot adopt a unilateral 
approach to its foreign and security problems because the 
institutional and societal constraints are simply too vast 
and the incentives for multilateralism too abundant. 
Germany will not cast aside its established network of 
institutional and other ties to its Western neighbours in 
favour of a new Sonderweg, or special (and disastrous), 
German path.
To the question of Germany's role in international secu-
rity today, as compared with the past, optimists among the 
experts provide two answers. For some, multilateral insti-
tutions of a transatlantic and West European nature have 
supplied the solution to Germany's age-old security dilem-
ma. German leaders, understanding where their country's 
best interests lay, wisely chose the path that would bind 
them to Western structures after the catastrophes of two 
world wars, and nothing has happened since 1989 to make 
them abandon their faith in the country's self-imposed '
cocooning.'
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For other optimists, what is truly remarkable today is 
not so much the institutional structure of peace; it is rather 
the ideational one. In other words, the norms and values of 
democracy have become so firmly implanted in the con-
temporary German socio-political order that it remains 
fundamentally impossible for the country ever again to 
menace the European or transatlantic status quo. 
Germany will have its own interests to pursue, to be sure, 
but it will do so through peaceful, 'civilian' means backed 
up by confidence in the durability of the 'democratic 
peace.'
For the optimists, then, Germany's strength will keep it 
peaceful - a strength that inheres both in the country's 
international institutional linkages and in its domestic 
economic and political arrangements. But pessimists (and 
there are some, especially in the ranks of the international 
relations theorists) deduce from the assumption of 
German strength the opposite conclusion, that a future 
challenge to the international security order is well nigh 
inevitable. In particular, the breed of theoretician known as 
the 'structural realist' sees in the rise of German power evi-
dence that a challenge to American primacy is in the offing.
For structural realists, peace in the long post-World War 
ii period was kept by the bipolar international 'structure,' 
which organized states into two tightly bound alliances,
Hundreds gather at the Berlin Wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate in 
hopes that the East German troops would smash their way through 
at this highly symbolic point
possessed of the nuclear wherewithal to preserve an uncer-
tain peace by the prospect of certain annihilation in any 
superpower war. Without that bipolarity, one can expect 
the future of interstate relations to look like nothing so 
much as the pre-1939 era. In the words of a leading struc-
tural realist, international relations at that time consisted 
of the 'same damn things over and over again: war, great 
power security and economic competitions, the rise and 
fall of great powers, and the formation and dissolution of 
alliances.'5
Despite the welter of publications that followed on the 
heels of German unification and were concerned with the 
ultimate meaning of the newer, ostensibly 'stronger,' 
Germany for European and international security, it soon 
appeared that the real problem was going to be Germany's 
weakness, not its strength. Images of a 'Fourth Reich' that 
characterized much of the debate in 1990 and 1991 soon 
gave way to anxiety about whether a new Weimar was in 
the making. In contrast both with today's general opti-
mism regarding Germany's security future and with the 
initial assumption that unification was going to produce a 
stronger Germany, the mood in 1992 and 1993 among 
Germany watchers swung sharply toward pessimism, and 
for reasons related to internal and external developments.
The principal cause of disquiet in the latter category was 
German diplomacy over the disintegrating Yugoslavia, 
especially the clumsy attempt to get the Europeans to 
extend early recognition to the breakaway republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia. But most of the anxiety about
B  T  H
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Germany's future in 1992 and 1993 stemmed from the 
domestic front. By late 1992, in the aftermath of 
Germany's summer of discontent symbolized by the name 
of a Mecklenburg port city, Rostock, it was becoming 
harder to sustain the early post-unification thesis that 
Germany had become stronger. Instead, analogies were 
increasingly drawn between Bonn and Weimar. With an 
apparent rise in right-wing ultranationalism, a confused 
and at times supine state, and the replaying of all-too-
familiar battles between leftist and rightist extremists in 
Germany's streets, all but the most Micawberish students 
of the new Germany were evincing concern that occasion-
ally bordered on alarm.
What had gone so wrong, so quickly? To begin with, the 
challenge of absorbing and genuinely integrating the old 
East Germany was proving far more difficult and costly 
than even its strongest proponents could have imagined in 
the heady months between the tumbling of the Wall and 
the disappearance of the GDR. Now, to that challenge was 
added an influx of refugees from further east in Europe that 
was larger than that arriving in any other West European 
country - in some cases by many orders of magnitude.
As the 'new world disorder' shunted aside the cold war 
order, the flood of asylum seekers into Germany intensi-
fied: in 1989, 120,000 sought a better life there; in 1990, 
nearly 195,000 more came; in 1991, a further 256,000 
entered; and in 1992, some 440,000 arrived. For a country 
that placed such value on ethnic homogeneity as a social
East German border guards look through a hole in the Berlin Wall after 
demonstrators pulled down a segment
good, and was maintaining at one and the same time a very 
liberal asylum policy and a highly restrictive immigration 
one, the costs were substantial, and showed up in a 
number of widely publicized acts of violence against 
asylum seekers and other foreigners that peaked in 
1992, when 2,639 such incidents were recorded.
Germany was by no means the only West European 
country that had to deal with a rise in social and political 
tension associated with increased migratory inflows; in a 
sense, it was not even the most xenophobic; polls revealed 
that some of its West European partners - France and 
Greece, to name two - were more hostile to 'foreigners.' 
Nevertheless, for reasons related to its history, its centrali-
ty to Europe geographically and economically, and its 
potential political and even military power, the events in 
Germany seemed to generate greater shockwaves than did 
similar anti-foreigner activities elsewhere in Europe. This 
led some observers to speculate during the mid-1990s 
that the refugee crisis was liable to send the Germans 
careering off on another dangerous Sonderweg, fuelled 
like the last one in no small measure by an invigorated 
nationalism.6
Despite such fears, the refugee crisis did not destabilize 
Germany. Notwithstanding the images of skinheads and
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other goons running riot through German streets in 1992 
and 1993, right-wing extremism has been held in check (
though not eliminated) in the past few years, both in 
those streets and at the ballot box. A good part of the expla-
nation for the demise of the extreme right is to be found in 
the country's revised asylum policy, which took effect on 1 
July 1993. Its legality was upheld by the constitutional 
court in Karlsruhe when it ruled in May 1996 that the gov-
ernment was within its rights to exclude from asylum con-
sideration anyone who entered Germany from a 'third 
country' that was thought to be a respecter of human 
rights or directly from other countries held to be 'safe.' In 
practice this has meant that no one could claim asylum if 
he or she entered Germany from a bordering state, or from 
the non-contiguous members of the European Union, or 
from Norway and a host of other third and safe countries.
It is reasonably safe to conclude, with the dark days of 
the early 1990s well behind us, that there no longer is a
Federal Republic has known.'' If anything, a case can be 
made that the funding scandal carries with it the potential 
to move the country further in the direction of reform and 
modernization, which should bolster democracy.
The challenge to security lies elsewhere, albeit in such a 
way as to emphasize the eternal verity that security and eco-
nomics are inextricably intertwined. The link between eco-
nomics and security could be made in a number of ways; not 
too long ago, it was common to hear (and to read) that the 
threat lurked in the country's high unemployment rate. As 
Ethan Kapstein, an early critic of globalization, expressed it, 
the 'world may be moving inexorably toward one of those 
tragic moments that will lead future historians to ask, why 
was nothing done in time?' With undisguised allusions to 
Weimar Germany, he continued: 'it is sobering to realize 
that Germany's current level of four million unemployed is 
the highest it has been since the early 1930s.''
Nor was it just American (and other foreign) writers
And so it is that Germany is struggling to pare back state spending 
and restore its economic competitiveness. Herein arises the security 
preoccupation associated with today's Germany: the fear that it will be 
unwilling or unable (or both) to shoulder its share of the defence 
burden on a continent from which war has not been banned and in an 
alliance that seems to ache for a 'new transatlantic bargain' ...
`German problem' in international relations. Germany 
seems to have become what many a decade ago insisted it 
could never be permitted (or allow itself) to become, a 'nor-
mal' nation. Germany is a normal nation, but therein lies 
the rub: it is 'normal' for states to run into problems that, 
unless skilfully managed, can threaten to complicate, if not 
undo, their foreign policy. The United States has known 
such occasions, and not just once, and so too have lesser 
powers like Canada (to say nothing of France or Britain).
So what are the challenges of the early 21st century that 
most bear watching, from the perspective of Germany and 
international security? To begin with, let us dismiss the like-
lihood that recently discovered slush funds operated by the 
former Christian Democratic government carry the poten-
tial to destabilize the country's party system, and therefore 
its democracy, and thus constitute, in the alarming words of 
one long-time Germany watcher, the 'worst crisis the
who could sound so ominous: the former chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, was a past master at drawing connections 
between economic developments (especially those related 
to European integration) and the future of European 
peace. According to the chancellor, what was at stake in the 
early 1990s' drive toward European monetary union was 
much more than a common currency. The latter was mere-
ly a means, albeit an important one, of melding the myri-
ad nations of (Western) Europe into a federal entity that 
would be capable of preserving the peace and prosperity 
Europeans have only occasionally known in their long his-
tory, even if they have known nothing else in those recent 
decades of the cold war dubbed 'the Long Peace.' 'Thus 
integration could never be allowed to lose momentum, for 
if it did, could disintegration be averted?
As the chancellor saw things (and he was not alone), the 
peace and freedom of Europe could not be taken for grant-
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ed even though no great-power threat loomed on the con-
tinent. Indeed, the chancellor believed that the primary 
security threat to Europe might be Europe itself, that is, its 
tendency to relapse into nationalism of a politically 
destructive nature. That is why, as he put it on numerous 
occasions, the 'politics of integration is really a question of 
war and peace in the 21st century.'9
Here, Kohl was simply reiterating what his French 
counterpart, Francois Mitterrand, had also argued, most 
notably in his address to the European Parliament on 17 
January 1995, when he hinted that unless the integration
One never relishes an accusation 
of being a deadbeat, and the 
government ... will squirm a bit 
as a result of that charge ... 
but, for the allies who complain 
about German underspending on 
defence, solace may be found in 
the reflection that this is not what 
they used to worry about before 
they became allies.
of Europe gained momentum and the virus of nationalism 
was held in check, the continent would revert to former, 
sinister, means of interstate interaction. In case anyone 
missed his point, Mitterrand made it plain that 'national-
ism means war!"° This is the context in which one had to 
contemplate the initial anxiety of European federalists over 
European Monetary Union, namely that it might never be 
accomplished, with calamitous consequences for the old 
continent.
But EMU was accomplished, and if the Euro's drop in 
value throughout the year of its introduction (1999) min-
imized some worries about an impending financial tussle 
between 'Euroland' and the United States, it nevertheless 
unleashed some other security-related concerns.
Incredibly, by the end of the decade many saw Germany as 
the economic 'sick man' of Western Europe. The once-
vaunted German model had stalled, victim it seemed of an 
excess of generosity (and not just toward the new Lander in 
the east) and a shortfall in productivity, as German com-
panies felt the ever-tightening grip of a vice, the jaws of 
which were embossed with 'globalization' and the 'social 
safety net.' To continue providing services Germans had 
come to take for granted, deficit financing had become the 
order of the day. But that technique, as Canada discovered 
earlier in the 1990s, can buy only so much time; eventual-
ly the piper must be paid.
And so it is that Germany is struggling to pare back state 
spending and restore its economic competitiveness. 
Herein arises the security preoccupation associated with 
today's Germany: the fear that it will be unwilling or 
unable (or both) to shoulder its share of the defence 
burden on a continent from which war has not been 
banned and in an alliance that seems to ache for a 'new 
transatlantic bargain' in which (presumably) NATO finds 
greater equilibration in the post-Kosovo era through the 
West European search for a more robust defence 
capability (a European Security and Defence Identity, or 
ESDI) within the alliance. All members of the European 
Union appear to have convinced themselves that ESDI is a 
necessity if they are to continue to experience in the next 
half-century anything like the stability and prosperity 
West Europeans have known in the past half-century.
The principal challenge for the Germans will inhere in the 
evolution of ESDI. If burden sharing increasingly char-
acterizes Western security, and if the Europeans are to be 
encouraged and expected to take on more responsibility 
for their own security interests - including those that might 
be threatened from what used to be called the 'out-of-area' 
regions - then it would be logical to assume that Germany 
must play a larger role in safeguarding, with force if need 
be, the interests of Europe. It is difficult to see how 
Germany can be brought easily to accept such responsibil-
ity. Not so long ago the problem was thought to be 
German constitutional and psychological inhibitions 
against the use of force except in the event of an attack on 
German territory or the territory of some of Germany's 
allies. Certainly the 'Kohl doctrine,' which forbade 
German troops from being deployed on terrain once trod 
by the Wehrmacht, seemed a constraint on participating in 
just the sort of crisis-management activities that currently 
give NATO meaning.
But quickly the Kohl doctrine, too, disappeared, so that 
Germans are now legitimate partners in policing the
1 0  B  T  H
Balkans - even (though to a limited extent) going on 
bombing raids against one of those Balkan countries, 
Serbia. A decade ago, only a few would have imagined such 
a possibility. And while some might see in Germany's exer-
cise of the responsibilities of a 'normal' state a re-emer-
gence of the German problem in international relations, 
the truth is, that old menace is dead. The country's securi-
ty difficulties in the future will be of a more mundane 
nature, in some respects not terribly different from those 
facing Canada: can it afford to pay for the security it needs? 
And though Germany's challenges will continue to tax the 
ingenuity of policy-makers, to say nothing of the patience
Not so long ago the problem was 
thought to be German 
constitutional and psychological 
inhibitions against the use
of force except in the event of an 
attack on German territory or the 
territory of some of Germany's 
allies ... But quickly the Kohl 
doctrine, too, disappeared...
of friends and allies, German security deficiencies in the 
medium-term will owe far more to sins of omission than of 
commission.
One never relishes an accusation of being a deadbeat, 
and the government of Gerhard Schroder will squirm a bit 
as a result of that charge being flung by some of the allies; 
but, for the allies who complain about German under-
spending on defence, solace may be found in the reflection 
that this is not what they used to worry about before they 
became allies. Until such time as the Germans solve their 
fiscal crisis and reclaim the mantle of economic competi-
tiveness, that will continue to be the 'problem' vis-a-vis 
Germany and international security.
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INSIGHT
Micro-credit, poverty and
development: the case of Bangladesh
Very small loans used to encourage entrepreneurs in the Third World are being 
hailed by some as a powerful tool in the eradication of poverty. One of the 
founders of micro-credit describes what it is doing for the people of Bangladesh.
B Y  F .  H .  A B E D
M icro-credit has created enor-mous  in te res t  among  
deve lopment practitioners and 
policy-makers in many parts of the 
world. It has also garnered wide 
support from aid agencies, 
governments, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the public 
at large. Assuming the character of a 
movement, it has spread to four con-
tinents and even percolated into the 
heartland of the USA. In 1997, the 
influential New York Times went so far 
as to proclaim that microfinance was 
the 'much needed revolution in anti-
poverty programs." Since then, there 
has also been a micro-credit summit 
`to extol its virtues before the world 
leaders and give a call for mobilization 
of $20 billion for channeling as small 
loans for alleviation of poverty not 
only in the Third World but also in 
the developed nations where pockets 
of poverty exist.'2 According to the 
senior vice president and chief econo-
mist of the World Bank, cmicrocredit 
programs are an effective policy 
instrument for reducing poverty 
among poor people with the skills to 
become self-employed. It also shows 
that such programs are more cost-
effective than other types of 
antipoverty program:3
Micro-credit: definition and use
Simply put, micro-credit describes 
small loans made to poor households 
to finance small-scale entrepreneurial 
activities. NGos in Asia, Africa, and 
La t in  Amer ica  a re  the  l a rges t  
providers of micro-credit to those 
sections of society - rural landless, 
disadvantaged women, marginal 
farmers, and wage labourers - who 
depend largely on selling their labour 
for a living. In many countries, the 
poor have little or no access to 
institutional credit because they have 
no assets that can be used as 
collateral. Micro-credit has emerged 
in those countries as a potent 
instrument to alleviate poverty and 
improve the access of the poor to 
financial services. Such credits, which 
are otherwise unavailable to the poor 
or available only at exorbitant terms 
from moneylenders, enable poor 
households to undertake productive 
economic activities and provide an 
opportunity to escape the shackles of 
poverty. Against this background, 
micro-credit programmes have ex-
panded rapidly in the low-income 
countries and have become more than 
a poverty reduction strategy. Because 
they are attractive to donors, they
have helped many NGO5 to build a 
financially sustainable pool of inde-
pendent working capital.
Micro-credit: some strategic issues
Many countries have established 
micro-credit programmes and micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) over the 
last two decades. Their growth in dif-
ferent parts of the world has given rise 
to some critical issues and questions:
■ where micro-credit is used and to 
what end;
■ whether wider financial services 
can be used effectively by the 
poor;
■ whether micro-credit is used as a 
development strategy and as an 
alternative and/or complimentary 
strategy;
■ whether credit alone can 
address the problems of  
poverty,  or  whether it has to be 
accompanied by broader 
intervention programmes of 
social development and 
mobilization; and
■ micro-credit's future potential.
Micro-credit, in combination with other social 
development programmes, is improving the 
living conditions of many of the poor in 
Bangladesh
Nick Etheridge
12 B T  H
B  T  H  1 3
These issues are discussed with par-
ticular reference to the experiences of 
Bangladesh where micro-credit has 
attained unprecedented growth. 
Bangladesh has provided models of 
recognized global significance in such 
aspects of micro-credit as scale of 
operation, modes and practices of 
micro-credit, alternative models of 
wider financial services, programme 
sustainability, and empowerment of 
women. Illustrations have largely 
been drawn from the Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAG), one of the largest NGOs in the 
world, which has a sizeable micro-
finance operation.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh can be considered the 
birthplace of the current concept of 
micro-credit; the NGOs here have rich 
experience in the field; and Ban-
gladesh is regarded as a leader among 
those low-income countries that pro-
vide micro-credit. As some interna-
tional commentators have observed: `
while there are numerous models and 
practices around the world linking 
financial services to the livelihood
Table 1: Micro-credit in Bangladesh 
(NGOs and GB) : June 1998
Membership 9,511,427
Savings of the members 234
(million us$)
Cumulative disbursement 3,038
(million us$)
Source: F H Abed, 'Micro-credit 
programme of BRAG: meaningful 
cooperation in poverty alleviation'; 
unpublished paper, 1999
strategies of the poor, the experience 
of Bangladesh has become globally 
influential:4
Both public and private sector 
organizations are involved with 
micro-credit in Bangladesh, but NGOs 
have taken the lead. Of the approxi-
mately 15,000 registered NGOs in 
Bangladesh, nearly 1,000, including 
BRAG, provide a large part of the 
micro-credit services. Grameen Bank 
has received international recognition 
for its micro-credit services. Together, 
N G O s  and Grameen Bank have  
enrolled around nine million poor in 
their micro-credit programmes. BRAG 
alone has organized over 3.3 million 
poor, approximately 96 per cent of 
whom are women, into its micro-
credit programme. The growth of 
micro-credit programmes can be seen 
in Table 1.
Growth  o f  mic ro -c red i t  has  
spawned two new institutions to meet 
specific needs. The Palli Karma-
Shahayak Foundation (msF), funded 
by the government and the World 
Bank, provides credit funds to wis. 
The Credit and Development Forum (
CDF) is a networking NGO that pro-
vides need-based training and cus-
tomized service to its member NGOs.
As NGO programmes expand in 
Bangladesh, so too does micro-credit. 
Programmes are expected to triple 
over the next seven years, thereby rais-
ing the annual disbursement to us$3 
billion from the current level of one 
billion dollars. The number of bor-
rowers is expected to reach 12 million. 
Some bas ic  informat ion  about  
Bangladesh is provided in this con-
text.
Bangladesh - some basic facts
Bangladesh, which broke away from 
Pakistan in 1971, is the most densely 
populated country in the world. With
Table 2: Some basic facts about 
Bangladesh 
Population (1996) 126 million
Density (population per 850
su. km)
Human Development 147
Index Rank (1998)
Infant mortality (1996) 83
Adult literacy (1998) 51%
GNP per capita (1998) us$ 280
Landlessness 50%
Population in poverty 47%
(below 2,122k
cals/day/person)
Source: UNDP, 1998; UNICEF, 1998;
A . M .  R .  C h o w d h u r y  a n d  A .  
Bhuiya, 'Do poverty alleviation pro-
grammes reduce inequalities in 
health? The Bangladesh experience,' 
in Leon and Walt, eds, Poverty 
Inequal i ty  and  Heal th  (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press forthcom-
ing).
a per capita gross national product of 
us$280, it is also one of the poorest. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the 
population live in rural areas, and 60 
per cent of the labour force depend on 
agriculture for their livelihood. Over 
half of the population is landless. 
Between 1975 and 1993 food pro-
duction almost doubled, and life 
expectancy increased by 30 per cent 
between 1970 and 1996. Net enroll-
ment in primary schools has increased 
to 77 per cent, and the gender gap has 
been considerably reduced.
Despite these impressive strides, 
Bangladesh ranks 18th from the bot-
tom among 123 developing coun-
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tries, according to the World Bank's 
new system of measuring the wealth 
of nations (PPP).
In Bangladesh the constitutional 
responsibility for development rests 
with the government, which has not 
always performed to its full potential, 
especially true in the area of poverty 
alleviation. The War of Liberation in 
1971 raised new expectations and 
provided fresh impetus to create a just 
and poverty-free Bangladesh. The 
NGOs, born out of the need for relief 
and rehabilitation operations in the 
aftermath of war, got involved in this 
task and later in the field of develop-
ment. BRAG is one such organization.
BRAG - from relief to poverty 
alleviation
BRAG started its work in 1972 with a 
relief and rehabilitation project. In 
1973 it shifted its strategies from 
addressing the 'acute crisis' of the 
aftermath of the war to dealing with 
the 'persistent crisis' of development. 
Over the years BRAG has grown expo-
nentially in development innovation 
and scale. It now works in all parts of 
Bangladesh and implements nation-
wide programmes on poverty allevia-
tion through micro-financing, non-
formal primary education, and health 
programmes. Its runs over 34,000 pri-
mary schools for 1.2 million children. 
Seventy per cent of the students are 
girls and over 90 per cent of the teach-
ers are women. BRAC's health and 
population programme covers around 
35 million people. Using village-
based voluntary health workers, it 
provides essential health services to 
villagers with emphasis on specific 
diseases such as tuberculosis and 
women's issues such as family plan-
ning and nutrition.
BRAC's primary poverty alleviation 
effort is its Rural Development
Programme (RDP), a multifaceted 
programme designed to promote 
both social and economic develop-
ment. The RDP is active in over 
50,000 of Bangladesh's 86,000 vil-
lages and involves nearly 3.3 million 
poor women from as many families. 
The twin goals of BRAG, poverty alle-
viation and empowerment of women, 
are reflected in RDP's activities and 
strategies.
Impact of micro-credit in 
Bangladesh
Micro-credit programmes have had 
an impressive impact on reducing 
poverty in Bangladesh. The provision 
of financial services, skills training, 
and targeting mechanisms has trans-
lated into big changes for the pro-
gramme participants. For example, a 
variety of skills have been passed on to 
the poor participating in BRAC's RDP -
modern methods of poultry rearing, 
cattle rearing, pisciculture, sericul-
ture, vegetable cultivation, plant
nursery, and so on. The technology 
diffusion in the poorer households 
has helped them to widen their  
income earning potential. A study 
sponsored by the World Bank has 
produced evidence of the wide-rang-
ing impact of micro-credit on the 
conditions of borrowers. The study, 
which examined programmes of 
BRAG, Grameen Bank, and RD-12 of 
Bangladesh Rural Development 
Board (BRDB), a public sector organi-
zation, found that per capita expendi-
ture had increased among the micro-
credit borrowers in all of these pro-
grammes. A household's net worth 
also increased. The study clearly indi-
cates that micro-credit reduces both 
moderate and extreme poverty,  
though at varying rates.'
Another study examined the effect of 
micro-credit on poverty, vulnera-
bility, and female empowerment. (
Micro-credit programmes operated 
by the NG0s, Grameen Bank and pub-
lic sector organizations are largely, if 
not entirely, targeted at women.)
Table 3: Some basic facts about BRAG: 1999
Full-time staff 24,200
Part-time staff 33,746
Number of districts 64 (of 
64)
with BRAG programme
Participants in 3.3 million
poverty alleviation
households
programme
Loans disbursed us$ 900 
million to the poor
Percentage of loans 98%
repaid
SOURCE: BRAG programme records
Amount saved by us$ 68
village organization million
members
Primary schools run 34,517
by BRAG
Students enrolled 1.2 million
(70% girls)
Population covered 35 million
in BRAC's health pro-
gramme
Total budgetus $131 million
B  T  H  1 5
Results suggest that micro-credit's 
greatest impact is on the set of indica-
tors relating to female control over 
assets and knowledge of social issues.6 
Other empirical studies have also 
come to the conclusion that `micro-
credit has been found to strengthen 
crisis-coping mechanisms, diversify 
income-earning sources, build assets 
and improve the status of women.'' 
One study specifically estimates that `
for every 100 taka lent to a woman, 
household consumption increases by 
18 taka; interestingly the figure is 11 
taka if the same amount was lent to a 
man.'8 Two other studies have found 
that 'a small amount of money works 
as a miracle in a cash-hungry society 
and significantly raises the woman's 
power in the family.'9
Women in Bangladesh, particularly 
those in poor households, are the 
most disadvantaged group. A large 
number of studies on microfinance 
and women's empowerment suggest 
that the former has had an impact on 
the latter. The mobility of the women 
outside their home and some control 
over their own income have increased.
In many cases, women participate in 
decisions that have to do with house-
hold issues. Women in BRAC's micro-
credit programme have become criti-
cally aware of issues relating to dowry, 
family and inheritance laws, family 
planning, and education of their chil-
dren.
All of these studies point to three 
things: micro-credit's impact on 
poverty, its protection against vulner-
ability, and its empowerment 
of women. Nearly half of the 
population of Bangladesh still lives 
below the poverty line. The women, 
particularly those from poor 
households, are the most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged. Alleviation of 
poverty has been accorded 
priority. So has the issue of gender 
equity and empowerment of
women. As a part of the national 
development strategy, micro-credit 
programmes are playing an important 
role in both.
Some people question whether the 
poor can use wider financial services 
effectively. Micro-credit has helped 
capacity development of the poor in 
several ways. Training in marketable
skills, diffusion of new ideas and 
technology, and peer consultation 
have enabled the poor who 
participate in the programme to 
use their credit quite effectively. 
All micro-credit programmes use 
community-based organizations to 
ensure the active and direct 
participation of borrowers in the 
lending process. MFis have used the 
group-based approach to enforce 
their targeting criteria. This approach 
has fostered participation and social 
mobilization. In Bangladesh, a chron-
ic problem for commercial banks and 
development finance institutions 
is the accumulation of large non-per-
forming loans. This has, in turn, cre-
ated a serious problem in the financial 
sector. Micro-credit has helped 
to break the legacy of defaulting 
on loans.
Micro-credit and modern 
technology
Micro-credit has largely been used in 
Bangladesh for traditional activities. 
Its full potential has, therefore, been 
held back by the virtual absence of 
modern production technology in 
rural areas. BRAG has made a 
significant commitment to new 
technology in its micro-credit 
programme. The technologies 
include: high yielding varieties of 
birds, vaccination, modern 
hatchery, and chick rearing units in 
poultry; insemination of livestock; 
fish hatchery development; seed mul-
tiplication, tissue culture, and the use 
of hybrid seeds in crop production; 
and improved varieties of mulberry 
trees, quality production of cocoons, 
and modern reeling facilities for the 
sericulture programme. Effective use 
of these technologies requires 
training, which can substantially 
increase productivity and profit 
margins. Micro-credit and skills 
development training have to go 
together. In corn-
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bination, they can significantly 
increase the effectiveness and produc- 
tivity of micro-credit programmes. 
Micro-credit and social development 
MFIS follow different approaches in 
providing micro-credit. There are 
basically three approaches: 'credit 
alone,' 'credit plus,' and 'credit with 
social development.' In Bangladesh 
the four largest MFIS are BRAC, 
Proshika, ASA, and Grameen Bank. 
The first three are NGOS. BRAC and 
Proshika have combined credit with 
social development programmes. ASA 
is operating a one-dimensional credit 
programme. Grameen Bank's pro- 
gramme is also one-dimensional, but 
it encourages some social develop- 
ment activities for its borrowers. 
Proponents of the credit-alone 
approach argue that the poor need 
capital; if it is provided in the form of 
credit, the poor will be able to take 
advantage of some interactive forces 
within the economy to improve their 
economic condition. 
This argument, however, neglects 
the fact that many other factors - 
health and education, to name two.- 
are equally important for poverty alle- 
viation. Take health, for example. 
Bangladesh is poor by almost all 
health indicators - morbidity, malnu- 
trition, access to medical care, and so 
on. To focus on the first indicator, 
morbidity is associated with the eco- 
nomic status of households: income 
erosion as a result of morbidity fur- 
ther impoverishes the poor. A recent 
study found that poor households in 
Bangladesh, that is, those with a 
monthly income of less than taka 
1000 (us$~O), showed a morbidity of 
215 per thousand or 35 per cent high- 
er than the morbidity rate for those 
earning taka 3,000 or more per 
month.1° These findings clearly sug- 
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gest that if micro-credit programmes 
are to succeed, they should address 
the health needs of the poor. 
A group of experts recently con- 
cluded that, while credit is obviously 
needed for poverty alleviation, it 
alone is not enough. Social develop- 
ment is a 'precondition for reahsing 
the full potential value of credit and 
financial interventions.'" The impor- 
tance of combining credit with social 
development interventions was em- 
phasized at a 1996 workshop in 
Dhaka: 'There is an overall preference 
... for combining a strategy of wider, 
flexible financial services with a recog- 
nition that the value of such financial 
services can only be secured in a sus- 
tainable way by wider forms of inter- 
vention in the political economy via 
various strategies of social mobilisa- 
tion and conducive' macro-economic 
management.'" 
BRAC believes that if problems of 
poverty are to be addressed, a micro- 
credit programme has to be accompa- 
nied by broader intervention pro- 
grammes of social development and 
mobilization. RDP, which is designed 
to deal with poverty alleviation, com- 
prises two broad activity areas - social 
development and economic develop- 
ment. 
Impact of holistic approach
Many experts and professional 
researchers have critically examined 
the  impac t  o f  B R A C ' s  ho l i s t i c  
approach. BRAG has, of course, car-
ried out its own assessments. Its 
Research and Evaluation Division (
RED) has produced nearly 750 
reports on different aspects of BRAG 
programmes, including their impact. 
One recent study, carried out jointly 
by RED and the International Centre 
for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, 
Bangladesh (ICDDR,B), looked at the 
impact of BRAC's multi-sectoral pro-
grammes on a variety of indicators. 
It found that BRAG member house-
holds spent significantly more on
food, which reflected higher calorie 
intake, decline in malnutrition, and 
increase in the rates of child survival 
compared to those not involved in 
BRAG programmes. The integration 
o f  c r e d i t  a n d  n o n - c r e d i t  
p r o grammes ,  tha t  i s ,  the  
ho l i s t i c  approach, has been 
particularly effective in 
empowering women. The study 
concludes: 'Poverty alleviation 
programmes focused on women as 
implemented by BRAG are effective in 
improving well-being, particularly in 
the areas of childhood nutrition and 
mortality.'
Micro-credit and the ultra poor
A criticism of micro-credit is that it 
has not reached the poorest of the 
poor. The criticism is valid. There is a 
segment within the poor who are 
worse off than ever. This is the seg-
ment that will not take loans because, 
with no regular source of income, 
they fear they will be unable to pay 
the regular instalments on a loan. The 
ultra poor are primarily women who 
are destitute, widows, or divorcees. 
They are less able and less willing to 
use credit profitably and to become 
self-employed. However, if safety nets 
and wage employment are provided, 
these women could be attracted to 
credit facilities.
In 1988, BRAG designed a large-
scale endeavour that became known 
as Income Generation for Vulnerable 
Groups  Development  ( I G V G D ) .  
IGVGD, which is supported in various 
ways by the government and the World 
Food Programme, provides wheat to 
the vulnerable women for 18 months. 
BRAG provides skills training credits 
and other support to these women to 
enable them to earn sustainable 
income. The Palli Karma Shahayak 
Foundation (PKsF), a newly developed 
financial institution, provides credit 
funding to BRAG and MFIs. Over
922,000 women have graduated from 
the IGVGD programme to BRAG'S RDP.
Micro-credit: what's in the future?
Access to financial resources in the 
form of collateral free loans has 
helped many borrowers of 
micro-credit programmes to cross 
the poverty line. Some emerging 
entrepreneurs are now prepared to 
make larger investments in their 
enterprises and consequently seek 
larger loans than NGOs usually 
provide. This emerging aspect of 
many micro-credit programmes 
calls for new solutions.
BRAG has attempted to address this 
situation and to meet the financial 
needs of specific groups. One such 
attempt is the new Micro Enterprise 
Lending and Assistance (MELA) pro-
gramme for micro entrepreneurs. 
MELA's objective is to create employ-
ment and increase community income 
by providing credit facilit ies of 
between Tk. 20,000 and Tk 200,000 (
us$ 400-4,000) and technical assis-
tance to small and new businesses. The 
borrowers in the MELA programme are 
the graduates of RDP and other mem-
bers of rural communities.
Another item on BRAG'S agenda for 
the future is a bank. A revitalized 
small or medium enterprise would 
create millions of jobs for the bur-
geoning population, including the 
poor who enter the job market every 
year. A BRAG bank would also provide 
financial services to NGOs. 
iences gained through micro-
credit operations can be immensely 
useful for operating the MELA and the 
bank. Micro-credit programmes have 
thus created a new dimension of 
financial services in Bangladesh.
Concluding observations
Micro-credit programmes are tools
Research has shown that micro-credit is more 
effective when it is used with other 
interventions. Preoccupation with micro-
credit should not displace social mobilization 
and social development programmes
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used to address poverty in 
low-income countries, tools used by 
interested governments, 
development organizations, and 
NG0s. Micro-credit has a positive 
impact on poverty r educ t ion  and  
in  empower ing  women. 
Because the ultra poor account 
for approximately one-tenth the 
population of Bangladesh, there are 
too many of them to be covered by 
micro-credit programmes. Since the 
poores t  o f  the  poor  cannot  be  
reached, an obvious question is: to 
what extent can micro-credit pro-
grammes be effective in poverty 
alleviation? Experience tell us that 
special programming with sufficient 
start-up support can attract many of 
the ultra poor towards micro-credit. 
BRAG'S IGVGD programme is a case in 
point.
Financial intervention alone can-
not address all the problems of pover-
ty. Poverty is multi-dimensional. 
Reducing poverty requires job cre
ation and an investment in human 
and social development to increase 
workers' productivity. Research has 
shown that micro-credit is more 
effective when it is used with other 
interventions. Preoccupation with 
micro-credit should not displace 
social mobilization and social 
development programmes. NGO 
micro-credit programmes in 
Bangladesh have recently 
concentrated on addressing basic 
human needs such as food, shelter, 
health, sanitation, and education of 
those most afflicted by poverty. The 
search for programme innovations 
and operational strategies must be 
ongoing if micro-credit programmes 
are to grow and to have an impact.
F.H. Abed is the founder and execu-
t ive  d i rec tor  o f  B R A C ,  Dhaka ,  
Bangladesh
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PERSPECTIVE
Canada's NATO commitment:
Current controversies, past debates,
and future issues
Since the conflict in Kosovo, we can probably expect the familiar debates about 
Canada's involvement in NATO to continue, as issues of cost-effectiveness, 
democracy, and constructive engagement remain unresolved.
B Y  E R I K A  S I M P S O N
Altrnhough Canada has been a corn-i t t e d  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
N o r t h  Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) since the alliance was 
founded in 1949, it has not greeted all 
NATO decisions with unalloyed 
pleasure, as the recent debate about 
enlargement and the controversy over 
NATO bombing of Kosovo and Serbia 
will attest. And we can probably 
expect yet another debate about 
Canada's commitment to NATO later 
this year because the foreign minister, 
Lloyd Axworthy, has promised to 
question NATO's continued reliance on 
nuclear deterrence. There is also 
bound to be future dissension over 
whether the Allies should embrace such 
countries as Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia in a 'second round of 
expansion.' While issues related to 
NATO expansion and the war in 
Kosovo have dominated the news 
lately, it might be useful to stand back 
and look at some past debates and 
possible future issues around Canada's 
NATO involvement since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the end of the cold 
war.
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
Expansion could be a risky business 
In the spring of 1999, before the war 
in Kosovo, NATO was preparing a 
party in Washington, DC, to mark its 
fiftieth anniversary. Celine Dion 
would sing, and NATO jet fighters 
would fly in formation overhead. 
Among the achievements to be cele-
brated was NATO's expansion from 16 
to 19 members as it took in Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 
the first round of enlargement. But 
the black ties and tuxedos were never 
unpacked, and the big party was can-
celled in favour of a quiet meeting to 
discuss what might be done about the 
crisis in Kosovo.
Although every political party in 
Russia vigorously opposed NATO 
expansion,  at  the last  moment,  
President Boris Yeltsin backed down. 
Nonetheless, the issue raised a great 
deal of controversy. Some NATO ana-
lysts in the West and in the East saw 
expansion as a regression to regional 
alliance formations and balance-of
power politics. Some even feared a 
return to the politics of containment, 
to the focus on military force, to col-
lective defence, and possibly extended 
deterrence. Others saw it as a 
challenge to current efforts, 
under the United Nations (UN) for 
example, to co-ordinate security at 
lower levels of defence expenditure 
and worried lest the expansion of a 
regional collective defence 
organization would be at the expense 
of efforts to reform a universal 
collective security organization 
such as the UN. Still others saw that 
expansion could risk another security 
dilemma, that efforts to increase NATO 
security might lessen Russia's sense 
of security and possibly lead to 
greater tensions, maybe even to 
another arms race in a divided 
Europe. Others argued that NATO 
expansion would
From left to right: Polish Prime Minister Mr. 
Buzek, Czech Prime Minister Mr. Zeman, NATO 
Secretary General Mr. Solana and Hungarian 
Prime Minister Mr. Orban at ceremony to mark 
accession of these countries to NATO
Photo courtesy of NATO
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provide Russian nationalists with 
another excuse to turn back the clock 
and reverse reforms. Nonetheless, 
plans were made to expand.
Now that the first round of expan-
sion has taken place, NATO policy-
makers must forge a consensus 
among 19 allies - NATO officially runs 
by consensus, not majority vote - to 
decide who will be accepted in the `
second round' of expansion. The 
risks that expansion could eventually 
lead Russia to move some of its con-
ventional or nuclear arsenal into 
defensive positions along a newly 
defined border, along a new central 
front remain.
On just which countries to invite 
into NATO during the second round -
Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Romania, or Bulgaria - NATO 
policy-makers are ambiguous. Their 
ambiguity stems, in part, from con-
cerns about the risk of undermining 
the credibility of article 5 of NATO, 
which I call the 'three Musketeers' 
article because it guarantees that an 
attack against one is an attack against 
all. This is by far the most important 
article in NATO's founding treaty. For 
example, during the Kosovo debate, 
the fact that technically Serbia's presi-
dent, Slobodan Milogevi, had not
violated article 5 was raised as a salient 
point. Article 5 raises other troubling 
questions. For instance, if Hungary, 
now a NATO ally, were to be drawn 
into a war with Romania over 
Transylvania, an area over which the 
two countries have argued for 
centuries, would NATO automatically 
be involved? Both countries made a 
great effort to patch up their 
differences so that they would be 
invited into the NATO club. But a few 
years or decades from now, if an 
armed conflict should occur, as it 
has done between two other NATO 
allies, Greece and Turkey, would 
Canada be left in a quandary about its 
article 5 commitment? It is fair to say 
that NATO expansion is not entirely 
risk-free.
The War in Yugoslavia and the 
Debate at Home
Most recently, the Canadian govern-
ment's strong support of NATO actions 
in Serbia and Kosovo during the war 
seemed to many to be proof of loyalty 
to the Alliance. Certainly, the United 
States Information Agency saw it that 
way.' However, the bombing did pro-
voke substantial public discussion 
about the role Canada should take in 
NATO's management of the crisis in 
Kosovo and Serbia. It also prompted 
fears about the nature of Canada's
NATO obligations should the war spill 
over into the rest of the Balkans. 
During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns 
were voiced about whether Canada 
should condone bombing a sovereign 
country that had not attacked any 
member of NATO, and that was tech-
nically outside NATO's territory of 
responsibility. When CF-18 Canadian 
fighter planes were sent to assist with 
the aerial bombing of Serbia and 
Kosovo, a debate arose over whether 
air strikes were necessary or morally 
unjustifiable.
Not surprisingly, the possibility of a 
ground war in the former Yugoslavia 
also incited a great deal of debate 
across the country and in the media. 
Many radio hot-line shows burned up 
the airwaves on the issue of contribut-
ing ground forces to Kosovo and the 
question of whether Canada should 
take  in  re fugees .  The  Defence  
Department housed thousands of 
refugees, temporarily, at various 
Canadian Forces bases.
Whether the federal cabinet was 
internally divided on these questions 
is not yet known. Certain comments 
by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that he 
harboured reservations about un-
equivocally supporting NATO's actions 
in the Balkans.2 Put simply, the war 
served to remind Canadians that 
NATO membership entails obligations 
and commitments that might be diffi-
cult to sustain.
DEBATES SINCE THE END OF THE 
COLD WAR
Challenge and Commitment
In 1987, the Progressive Conservative 
government of Brian Mulroney pub-
l i shed  a  de fence  wh i t e  pape r .  
Challenge and Commitment (some-
times rather derisively referred to as 
the 'coffee table white paper' because 
of its many colour photographs)
The government announcement in September 1991 
that it intended to withdraw all but 1200 troops 
from the central front in Germany came as no great 
surprise ... It was a different matter when the 
minister of finance announced plans to withdraw 
Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The 
members of the Canadian delegation to NATO were 
given only a few hours' notice...
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promised a significant increase in 
defence spending, ostensibly because 
of the challenge from the Soviet 
Union. It also promised to strengthen 
Canada's NATO commitments. Spe-
cifically, the government intended to 
acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-pow-
ered submarines at a cost of $10-$12 
billion. It wanted to double Canada's 
troop strength in Europe and mod-
ernize Canadian equipment for high-
intensity warfare on NATO's central 
front. Basically, the government pro-
posed to spend $183 bil l ion on 
defence over the next fifteen years. It 
was a very expensive package for 
countering the primary threat of the 
cold war.
A couple of years later, in 1989, the 
Conservatives suddenly announced 
an abrupt freeze on defence spend-
ing. They cut back major capital 
expenditures .  The nuclear  sub-
marines were cancelled along with 
new main battle tanks and plans to 
deploy a division in Europe. It was 
evident to almost everyone that the 
nature of the threat from the Soviet 
Union had changed. Canada could 
no longer devote so much money and 
resources toward improving collec-
tive defence, particularly through its 
NATO commitments.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1989 and war in the 
Persian Gulf in the winter of 1991, 
Canadians continued to debate 
whether there was any reason for 
Canada to retain its NATO commit-
m e n t s .  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s p e n t  
approximately $1 billion a year mere-
ly to maintain Canadian troops in 
Europe - and that did not include the 
cost of training, equipping, and sup-
plying the rest of the Armed Forces, 
which were also structured primarily 
for big-league NATO roles, including 
war in Europe.
Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC 
and Peacekeeping
The government announcement in 
September 1991 that it intended to 
withdraw all but 1200 troops from 
the central front in Germany came as 
no great surprise. The financial sav-
ings involved in a gradual withdrawal 
were estimated at some $1.2 billion 
over five years. It was a different mat-
ter when the minister of finance 
announced, in February 1992, plans 
to withdraw Canada's contingent 
from Europe completely. The mem-
bers of the Canadian delegation to 
NATO were given only a few hours' 
notice of the change in policy.  
Initially, the decision was difficult to 
justify, especially since just a few 
months before Mulroney had assured 
Helmut Kohl,  the chancellor of 
Germany, that Canada intended to 
retain a visible military presence on 
European soil. The European allies 
and the American military representa-
tives at Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) sharply criti-
cized the timing of the decision and 
the fact that it was taken without 
proper consultation with the other
Summit meeting: Bonn declaration stresses that 
NATO will never be the first to use arms
allies.' Canadian delegates to NATO 
and SHAPE in Brussels tried to soften 
the blow by underscoring Canada's 
commitment to European security 
through its peacekeeping efforts in 
the former Yugoslavia and by 
pointing out the significant role 
Canada's ambassador to NATO was 
playing in establishing the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NAcc)
.4
Mulroney had broached the idea of 
associate membership in NATO for for-
mer Warsaw Pact nations in 1991. 
When this possibility was rejected -
Britain and France worried about the 
security guarantee it entailed - the 
Canadian ambassador to NATO set 
about devising a form of NATO mem-
bership for the east Europeans under
NACC auspices.5
Then there was the claim that 
Canada's contribution to the peace-
keeping operation in Yugoslavia was a 
renewed contribution to European 
security. The claim was assisted by the 
high media profile of the commander 
of the UN forces, Canada's General
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Lewis Mackenzie. Indeed, it was not 
long before Canadians at NATO head-
quarters received requests from the 
other allies, including the Americans, 
for more information on peacekeep-
ing. Although high-level representa-
tives from allied countries such as 
Br i ta in  and Germany s t i l l  saw 
Canada's most valuable contribution 
to European security was to retain on 
European soil troops ear-marked for 
NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as 
if the sudden shift of interest to 
peacekeeping  might  somehow
brighten Canada's image at NATO 
headquarters.
The  gene ra l  a t t i t ude  o f  t he  
Canadian delegation to NATO was one 
of resignation. It was aware that the 
Canadian announcement was most 
likely a precursor to similar an-
nouncements of reductions and cut-
backs among the other allies. It was 
clear that Canada would remain an 
act ive part icipant  in the North 
Atlantic Council, in the hundreds of 
committees at NATO and SHAPE, and 
in the discussions surrounding the 
implementation of the New Strategic 
Concept. NATO's secretary-general, 
Manfred Woerner, assured the allies 
in February 1992, after the announ
cement of the troop withdrawal, that 
Canada would meet its other commit-
ments to NATO.6
Canada's Continuing Alliance 
Commitments
Despite the end of the cold war, many 
of Canada's other NATO commitments 
remained unchanged after the 1992 
announcement. For instance, it could 
still dispatch an expeditionary brigade 
group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and 
an air defence battery to Europe, if 
necessary. A Canadian Forces battal-
ion was prepared to deploy to Europe 
with the Allied Command Europe 
(ACE) Mobile Force or the NATO 
Composite Force. Canadians contin-
ued to serve as part of the NATO 
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system 
in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as 
aircrew aboard NATO AEW aircraft. 
Canadian destroyers and frigates were 
prepared to sail with the Standing 
Naval Force Atlantic, while eleven 
destroyers and frigates, one supply 
ship, three submarines, fourteen long-
range patrol aircraft, and twenty-five 
helicopters retained their role in 
patrolling the North Atlantic as part 
of NATO's 'augmentation' forces. 
Canada would continue to do its part
to defend the Canada-US region of 
NATO, as well as to contribute to the 
North American Aerospace Defence 
Command (NORAD), which is respon-
sible for the defence of NATO's largest 
single land mass. Canada also offered 
its allies facilities and territory for mil-
itary training, such as those at CFB 
Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo 
in Manitoba, and the underwater 
naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in 
British Columbia.
The Conservative government con-
tinued to demonstrate its support for 
NATO through other means as well. 
The portion of the infrastructure 
budget at NATO headquarters paid by 
Canada, although not widely known, 
was viewed at NATO headquarters as a 
significant contribution. The govern-
ment's intention to retain 
approximately 650 Canadian 
personnel at NATO and SHAPE as 
military planners, attaches, and 
representatives on the Canadian 
delegation was also seen as an 
important  commitment .  The 
renewal of a ten-year contract to train 
approximately 6,000 German Armed 
Forces annually at CFB Shilo and CFB 
Goose Bay was described as yet 
another example of Canada's 
intention to h e l p  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  
a l l i a n c e .  Although aboriginal 
residents complained about the 
environmental effects of low-flying 
jets, and Goose Bay was slated to be 
closed because the United States 
thought it was too expensive for 
training purposes, German and 
other NATO planes continued to train 
there.
The Chretien Government's 
Defence Review
In November 1993, Jean Chretien's 
new Liberal government announced a 
comprehensive review of Canadian 
defence policy, which precipitated 
another debate about Canada's NATO 
commitments. By February 1994, a
The challenge for Canada, once again, is to 
remain constructively engaged - to chart a safer 
course - and to ensure NATO responds cost- 
effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind 
the other NATO allies that some arguments, 
controversy, debate, and dissension can and 
should be expected in what is alleged to be a 
democratic relationship
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Special Joint Committee of the Senate 
and House of Commons was estab-
lished to initiate consultations and 
report to the government. In testimo-
ny before the Special Joint Corn-mit-
tee on Canada's Defence Policy, some 
policy-makers continued to argue 
that NATO had to remain a priority for 
both defence and foreign policy 
because of new conflicts in the world, 
particularly in Europe, the instability 
of the Russian leadership, and the 
remaining military threat. They 
advised the government to ensure 
that the country had modern military 
equipment and sufficient tri-service 
personnel to fulfil the strategic 
requirements of deterrence as well as 
NATO's  New Strategic Concept.  
Canada, they argued, must continue 
to structure and train its military for 
mid-to-high intensity combat opera-
tions. They acceded that Canada 
should contribute to UN peacekeeping 
and peacemaking operations, but 
such contributions should remain a 
low priority for the Canadian Forces 
relative to their general combat capa-
bility for defending Canada and its 
allies. As some argued, the alternatives 
posed a risk to security and stability as 
well as to Alliance relations. In their 
opinion, NATO was adapting to the 
new uncertain environment, and 
NATO alone retained the political 
coherence and military capabilities to 
ensure collective defence and security.'
Others assigned a lower priority to 
NATO with the disintegration of the 
Soviet military threat and the disap-
pearance of both the Warsaw Pact and 
the USSR. They noted the unlikeli-
hood of an attack across Europe's cen-
tral front and frequently cited the his-
toric inability of military alliances to 
combat diffuse threats such as ethnic 
conflict, environmental degradation, 
and human rights violations. Some 
suggested that Canada should de-
emphasize its military commitments 
to NATO but retain a diplomatic and 
consultative presence in the higher 
councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, 
many favoured increasing Canada's 
foreign aid and its contributions to 
UN agencies and operations. There 
were also related proposals for new 
defence priorities that would empha-
size monitoring and surveillance of 
Canadian territorial waters and air 
space as well as expand the country's 
commitment to peacekeeping opera-
tions under UN auspices. Rather than 
attempt to maintain a general-pur-
pose, combat-capable army, navy, and 
air force, there were calls for the 
Canadian Forces to be restructured 
and retrained to contribute more pro-
ductively to peacekeeping and the 
various initiatives outlined in the 
1992 UN Agenda for Peace. In the new 
environment, there would be unnec-
essary risks and expenses in adhering 
to the prevailing assumptions, prac-
tices, and institutions of the past fifty 
years.'
In the midst of this defence review, 
the government announced its com-
mitment to the conversion of Canadian 
Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia 
into a multinational training centre for 
UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At 
the new Lester B. Pearson Canadian 
International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre, the government would spon-
sor training for military and civilian 
personnel from countries participating 
in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well 
as from developing countries under 
Canada's Military Training Assistance 
Program. This decision provoked yet 
more controversy about peacekeeping 
training and the advisability of estab-
lishing a privatized peacekeeping train-
ing centre.
The 1994 Defence White Paper
In December, the Department of
National Defence released The 1994 
Defence White Paper, which 
announced that Canada would 
remain a full and active member of 
NATO. The monolithic threat to 
Western Europe had disappeared, and 
the principal responsibility for 
European defence lay with the 
Europeans. At the same time, the 
government valued the transatlantic 
link and recognized that NATO had 
made progress in adapting to a post-
cold war world. The paper noted in 
particular those aspects of NATO that 
reflected a co-operative approach to 
European security relations, 
including the creation of NACC, 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the 
development of the Combined Joint 
Task Force Concept. This perspective 
on NATO 'underpinned' the future of 
Canada's Alliance commitments. In 
the event of a crisis or war in Europe, 
the contingency forces Canada main-
tained for all multilateral operations 
would immediately be made available 
to NATO. Yet, for the first time, the 
Defence Department consistently 
referred to Canada's NATO defence 
commitments after pointing out the 
country's UN obligations. This seemed 
to herald a fundamental reordering of 
Canada's defence priorities.
The Costs of NATO Enlargement 
Predictably, the release of thie 1994 
white paper did not end the debate 
over  the measure and extent  of  
Canada ' s  N A T O  commi tmen t s .  
Gradually some high-level foreign 
and defence policy advisers became 
concerned about the costs of NATO 
enlargement for Canada. Prime 
Minister Chretien initially supported 
expanding NATO membership from 
twelve to sixteen (with Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovenia being the preferred addi-
tons). However, estimates of the costs 
of enlargement tended to vary widely,
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in part because of uncertainty about 
how many new members to admit. 
Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-
level American officials agreed that 
expansion would cost somewhere 
between US$27 billion and US$35 bil-
lion over the next 13 years.
Behind the scenes, some senior 
Canadian policy-makers worried 
about the looming costs of expansion 
and about the extent to which Canada 
should or could support the rebuild-
ing of the defence systems of the new 
members. In the weeks prior to ratifi-
cation of the enlargement decision in 
the United States Congress, the State 
Department concurred with NATO's 
revised assessment that enlargement 
could cost only us$1.5 billion rather 
than us$27-35 billion. Nonetheless, 
these wide variations in estimates 
among such reputable analysts as the 
United States Congressional Budget 
Office, the Pentagon, the State 
Department, and NATO headquarters 
raised more questions about the mea-
sure of Canada's NATO commitments 
and whether all estimates might prove 
to be too low. Even as NATO opened 
the door to the first round of expan-
sion, many Canadians worried about 
the potential cost of Canada's NATO 
obligations.
FUTURE ISSUES
NATO's Nuclear Strategy and the 
Middle Powers Initiative
One issue around which further con-
troversy will undoubtedly swirl is 
NATO's reliance on nuclear deterrence 
s t ra tegy .  The  N A T O  summit  in  
Washington in April 1999 opened 
the door to a wide-ranging review of 
NATO's nuclear weapons policy. 
NATO's  New Strategic Concept,  
which since 1991 has reaffirmed its 
reliance on nuclear weapons, will be 
reviewed and re-examined. Pressure
from the leaders of  the Middle 
Powers  In i t ia t ive  and  the  non-
nuclear weapon states, particularly 
from key policy-makers in Canada, 
Germany, Sweden, Norway, and 
Japan, may result in a serious review 
of the Strategic Concept. In particu-
lar, the Middle Powers Initiative, 
launched in 1998, could influence 
NATO's decision-making regarding its 
nuclear commitments and lead to 
important and subtle shifts in NATO's 
deterrence strategy between 2000 
and 2002.
The issue that NATO has promised 
to review is of historical and practi-
cal, as well as theoretical, interest. 
After fifty years of relying upon 
nuclear weapons for defence, recent 
developments, including the end of 
the cold war, present an opportunity 
to enter this millennium with a plan 
for the abolition of nuclear weapons. 
Many distinguished world figures 
argue that the risk of retaining 
nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far 
outweighs any possible benefit  
imputed to nuclear deterrence. They 
believe that the end of the cold war 
created a climate for international 
action to eliminate nuclear weapons, 
an opportunity that must be exploit-
ed quickly or it will be lost. They see 
the Middle Powers Initiative as a 
bold attempt to encourage NATO 
leaders to 'break free from their cold 
war mindsets' and move rapidly to a 
nuclear weapon-free world.
The Middle Power Initiative was 
launched to buttress the grassroots 
efforts of hundreds of international 
and non-governmental organizations 
de termined  to  abol i sh  nuc lear  
weapons. Canada's Senator Douglas 
Roche is the chair of the Middle 
Powers Initiative, which includes 
other non-nuclear weapon states 
such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO's
S t r a t e g i c  C o n c e p t  h a s  h a r d l y  
changed since 1991 on the issue of 
relying on nuclear weapons, the 
Washington summit communique, 
issued on 24 April 1999, commits 
NATO to 'review' its strategic policy. 
At a news conference on the same 
day, Lloyd Axworthy confirmed 
NATO's willingness 'to have a review 
initiated' of its nuclear weapons poli-
cies. Explaining that this was the 
thrust of the recommendations in the 
report of Canada's Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Axworthy added: 'It's a 
message that the [Canadian] Prime 
Minister took [to] certain NATO lead-
ers ... I think we have now gained an 
acknowledgement that such a review 
would be appropriate and that there 
would be directions to the NATO 
Council to start the mechanics of 
bringing that about.'9
T h i s  g i v e s  t h e  n o n - n u c l e a r  
weapon states in NATO, and the 12 
absta iners  on the  New Agenda 
Coalition's 1998 resolution at the 
UN, an opportunity to press for a 
`quality review' rather than a per-
functory one. The Middle Powers 
Initiative believes that the NATO 
communique strengthens the possi-
bility that appropriate representa-
tions can be made to a number of 
important  countries around the 
world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its 
official policy statement, that urged 
NATO to begin a nuclear weapons 
review, and this was carried into the 
NATO summit.  Members of  , the 
Middle Powers Initiative are expect-
ed to press for further changes in 
NATO's deterrence strategy in the near 
future.  Success wil l  depend on 
whether a new coalition of leaders 
from countries respected by the 
nuclear weapon states - especially by 
the United States - generates suffi-
c ien t  po l i t ica l  momentum and 
media attention. (It should be noted
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that Canada recently abstained on 
crucial nuclear disarmament resolu-
t ions  pu t  fo rward  by  the  New 
Agenda Coalition at the 1998 and 
1999  sess ions  o f  the  U N  Fi rs t  
Committee, and voted against reso-
lutions put forward by China and 
Russ ia  to  s t rengthen  the  Ant i -
Ballistic Missile Treaty.)
CONCLUSION
Canada's policy record since the end 
of the cold war indicates that it will 
remain committed to NATO, but on 
somewhat different terms. One sel-
dom reaches a si lver or golden 
anniversary in any relationship with-
out some doubts and an occasional 
shift in terms of commitment. Still, 
as many concede, this has been a rela-
tively successful alliance over the last 
fifty years. The challenge for Canada, 
once again, is to remain constructive-
ly engaged - to chart a safer course -
and to ensure NATO responds cost-
effectively and responsibly. Canada 
must remind the other NATO allies 
that some arguments, controversy, 
debate, and dissension can and 
should be expected in what is alleged 
to be a democratic relationship -
indeed, they may help improve this 
long-standing institution.
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REFLECTIONS
Bonn at the centre of the world
Random reminiscences that never find their way into the history books
B Y  T H O M A S  D E L W O R T H
L n fin de siecle Bonn, the only game in town changed in the late 
1980s from the diplomatic 
community's constant complaints 
about the boredom of life in the '
small town in Germany,' known 
affectionately as Bundesdorf or 
Langweiligsburg, to the bewildering 
excitement of unification-watching. 
Given the speed with which it 
happened, the daily challenge for 
diplomats and natives alike was to 
explain what happened yesterday 
before facing the daunting task of 
reading the new day's newspaper 
headlines. Within an amazingly short 
span of time, the basic architecture of 
the flawed 'settlement' - if it can be 
described as such - that imposed itself 
on Europe in 1945 came apart and 
opened the way for the two Germanys 
to be reunited, thereby setting the his-
tory of Europe on a new course. 
Throughout the long years of the cold 
war when the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) provided a stal-
wart shield against Eastern encroach-
ments on Western Europe, there were 
not many among the Allies who 
would have taken issue with the often 
unarticulated German dream of a 
united Germany: the dream of those
who believed in the inevitability of 
the once-and-future homeland no less 
than those who prayed for the disap-
pearance of that agonizingly danger-
ous dividing line. But, in the end, the 
realization of a dream shared by both 
romantics and strategic planners 
brought with it a lot of surprises - the 
most unexpected of which was that it 
happened at all.
The process was, most certainly, a 
triumph for the West - especially as 
not a single shot was fired. Has histo-
ry another example of such a cata-
clysmic revolution happening peace-
fully? But the unexpected reservations 
and qualifications and the long-sup-
pressed doubts and challenges that 
emerged from the onward rush of 
seemingly uncontrollable events were 
what made this page - or more accu-
rately, this huge chapter - in the histo-
ry of our times so fascinating.
A few words about the Stockholm 
Security Conference, 1984-6 (the so-
called CDE, but more properly CCSB-
MDE) might be a useful beginning for 
these anecdotal reminiscences. The 
conference, which began amidst the 
unabated tensions of the cold war -
circumstances that had energized
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's peace 
initiative - turned out to be more than 
routinely significant because it elicit 
ed the first signs of major changes in 
Soviet thinking. In the final days of 
the conference, rudimentary mea-
sures for military inspection and veri-
fication, which had eluded Western 
arms control negotiations for years, 
fell into place quickly in a framework 
of confidence-building. Few, if any, 
saw the real significance - although 
shortly after the conference ended the 
chief Soviet negotiator was cautiously 
but confidently predicting sweeping 
reforms as a result of internal events 
in the Soviet state. Delphic to be sure 
- but mind-boggling as a refreshing 
change from the usual banal Soviet 
diplomatic 'confidences' so common 
in earlier decades of cold war negotia-
tions and conversations.
But, like the gestation of elephants, it 
all begins by the dark of night, and it 
takes some time for anything to 
happen.
In early 1988, Bonn showed little 
sign of anything remarkably different 
from standard cold war postures and 
reactions. The Berlin Wall remained 
malevolently intact, and watchtow-
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ers, barbed wire, and killer dogs were 
commonplace as borders and border-
crossing points continued to embody 
the outward dimensions of divisive 
confrontation and human tragedy. 
The SNF and modernization debate 
swirled on with no real prospects for 
resolution despite seemingly endless 
and frantic political attempts to solve 
the problem with words. And yet 
there was, in some quarters, the quiet 
suspicion - or was it only hope? - that 
something might be happening in the 
closed world to the East. Sooner or 
later, and as a result in part of the cor-
ros ive  impact  of  the  Hels ink i  
Conference on Security and Co-oper-
ation in Europe (CSCE) on Soviet 
thinking, some gesture might well be 
made to the West, and especially to 
Germany, perhaps in military terms, 
but also, and more important, in a 
humanitarian context: measures to 
ease some of the restrictions on inter-
German travel and family reunifica-
tion, perhaps, or something similar.
It did not happen quite like that. 
Although the elements - and especial-
ly the 'human dimension' elements -
were all increasingly present, it took a 
little time for the final denouement to 
take shape and gather momentum.
State visits, official visits, working 
visits have all become so frequent in 
our times that it is sometimes difficult 
to assess their importance (if any) one 
by one. But, in this particular period, 
it was almost impossible to measure 
the real significance of each before a 
new one appeared on TV screens and 
in headlines. In the autumn of 1988 
the chancellor of West Germany, 
Helmut Kohl, visited Moscow with a 
supporting party of politicians, offi-
cials, and bankers that, gargantuan at 
the time, could stand respectable 
comparison in numbers with contem-
porary Team Canada travels. At the 
Un i t ed  Na t ions  a  mon th  l a t e r
Mikhail Gorbachev talked about 
freedom of choice. In June 1989 he 
visited Bonn in an atmosphere that 
a s su red  a  p l ace  fo r  t he  word  `
Gorbymanid in the work of German 
lexicographers. Meanwhile all sorts of 
extraordinary things were happening 
in eastern Europe that were difficult 
to put into meaningful patterns but 
that were nonetheless aspects of a 
rapidly changing scene. By the early 
autumn, Hungary opened its frontier 
to permit East Germans to move to 
the West; and the freedom trains 
were not far behind. And then came 
the death knell: Gorbachev's visit to
East Berlin for a major celebration of 
t h e  f o u n d i n g  o f  t h e  G e r m a n  
Democratic Republic (GDR): the 
speech in which he referred to the 
dangers of being left behind must 
have struck as much terror into the 
hearts of the East German party faith-
ful as it evoked incredulous joy in the 
Federal Republic. Was the Soviet 
Union actually abandoning the GDR? 
No one could possibly have suspected 
that we were about to witness the 
inexorable disintegration of a nation 
state (of sorts) like a sandcastle on the
beach as the tide comes in. No one, least 
of all the West Germans, for all their 
theoretical and assumed intelligence 
advantages in dealings with East 
Germany, really knew what was hap-
pening in the East, so quickly were 
events producing a political kaleido-
scope of chaos. It was almost 
universally assumed - because 
anything else was hardly conceivable - 
that something like the GDR would 
continue to exist but in a more liberal 
and humanized form.
It was also assumed that such a 
residual state would facilitate 
longterm reconciliation. The federal 
government even produced a rough 
blue-
A man waves to relatives on the other side of 
the wall
print for a Vertragsgemeinschaft, a 
community of agreements, by which 
inter-German relations would be gov-
erned. It went nowhere because the 
powerfu l  wave  engu l f ing  Eas t  
Germany had already undermined 
the foundations of the GDR on which 
Eastern participation in this commu-
nity of agreements was to have been 
built. Some officials in Ottawa grum-
bled petulantly (the Canadian nation-
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al preoccupation with being 'consult-
ed' was, as usual, alive and well) that 
this,  and indeed other forms of 
Bonn's responses to the cyclonic 
winds of change from the East, 'had 
not been vetted by NATO.' It is proba-
bly safe to assume that not even all 
interested officials in Bonn had been `
consulted' in many instances. But 
what would ultimately remain of the 
GDR was simply not grasped - nor 
indeed at the beginning could it have 
been.
Some members of NATO tried to 
move quickly to establish diplomatic
relations with what some saw as a new 
centre of authority or residual state 
emerging in East Berlin. No longer 
would relations be conducted, as 
many of the Allies, including Canada, 
had done, through their Warsaw 
embassies as dual accreditations. The 
Icelandic ambassador to Bonn pre-
sented his credentials in East Berlin, 
becoming the first NATO ambassador, 
probably the first diplomat of any 
stripe, and probably the last as well, to 
be concurrently accredited to two 
German capitals from Bonn, in an 
ironic reversal  of the Hallstein 
Doctrine that had been in force in a
long-ago world. Canada was prepar-
ing credentials, but the process was 
abandoned when it became clear that 
no one in East Berlin knew just who 
the head of state was (or would be, 
the next day), and the speaker of the 
Volkskommer was not sure that she 
was the proper public figure to pre-
side at such a portentous diplomatic 
happening. 'Let's wait and see.' And so 
Canada was deprived of a distinction 
achieved, so far as is known, by 
Iceland alone.
In the midst of all this chaos, the 
vision of a world without a GDR - and
indeed a lot of other things as well -
was beginning to emerge with some 
clarity. Greatly to the surprise of those 
who admired Kohl's decisive determi-
nation to take the tide of history at its 
flood and to lead Germany on to for-
tune (or, in Kohl's view, to its destiny), 
there were voices in the public debate 
that lamented the inevitable death of 
the German 'socialist' tradition whose 
heartland and homeland had been 
largely geographically congruent with 
the GDR. A not insignificant group of 
Greens, writers, and intellectuals 
asked whether an effort should not be 
made to prevent this. For Kohl and
his immediate advisers, such an argu-
ment was unthinkable: this was no 
time for misguided socialist romanti-
cism and historical nostalgia. It was 
instead an opportunity - perhaps 
fleeting - to achieve what Germans 
had dreamed of since the end of the 
war, a reunited homeland. And mak-
ing it possible was a Soviet Union 
itself in the throes of transformation. 
If only to answer the painful debate 
over short-range nuclear forces (SNF), 
only a fool would forego such an 
opportunity by adopting a go-slow 
policy. Ever true to his training as a 
historian, Kohl's single-minded 
determination to move forward 
without hesitation and without 
wrestling with enormous philosophi-
cal doubts was probably the out-
standing feature of the Bonn political 
landscape for months.
What disappointed Kohl deeply 
was the initial lack of spontaneous 
enthusiasm among some of the Allies 
for the prize he was grasping at so 
vigorously. He must have asked him-
self why not everyone seemed to be 
rejoicing at the prospect of an undi-
vided Germany without the wall and 
all it stood for. Reticence and hand-
wringing in the face of what was 
clearly inevitable seemed to Canada a 
poor substitute for policy, regardless 
of how others may have assessed the 
risks. Was it even conceivable in the 
minds of others more powerful than 
we that there might be effective mea-
sures that could be orchestrated to 
stop or deflect this headlong rush to 
satisfy the pent-up desires and frus-
trations of generations of Germans? 
Unification was going to happen. 
Was it in the broader interest for this 
to  occur  agains t  the  effor ts  of  
Germany's postwar friends who had 
always implicitly or explicitly envi-
sioned a freely united Germany as a 
desirable (if realistically unattain-
In early 1988, Bonn showed little sign of 
anything remarkably different from
standard cold war postures and reactions. The 
Berlin Wall remained malevolently intact, 
and watchtowers, barbed wire, and killer dogs 
were commonplace as borders and border-
crossing points continued to embody the 
outward dimensions of divisive confrontation 
and human tragedy.
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able!) objective? A Germany reunited 
without the blessing and active sup-
port of its major friends might have 
been tempted to lapse into a sullen 
and self-preoccupied mood, which 
would have been the worst possible 
outcome for all concerned. The 
Germans were realistic in their assess-
ments of the power factors involved 
and knew how serious the 
reservations in Paris and London 
and to a lesser extent in Washington 
were. But Canada's early and decisive 
rejection of such a `go-slow' option 
was noted in Bonn and publicly 
appreciated by Kohl. In any event, 
the Canadians were the first (or 
among the first few) to welcome the 
prospect of German unification 
despite our own share of painful 
memories.
But what to make of Margaret 
Thatcher's apparently active hesita-
tion? And above all, what of France, 
supposedly Germany's most devoted 
friend and partner as the 'engine' of a 
united Europe? Bonn officials could 
scarcely believe what they heard from 
Paris. As the East German sandcastle 
was in the final stages of being swept 
away, senior officials at the Elysee 
were exploring the possibility of an 
official visit by President Francois 
Mitterrand to ' the other half of 
Germany' in response, they said, to 
an  inv i ta t ion  i s sued  by  Er ich  
Honecker many years ago. By then, 
Honecker had disappeared from the 
scene. After all the fine rhetoric and 
all the planning for a new united 
Europe based on a Franco-German 
entente, the shattered Germans could 
only conclude that the French still 
believed in the aphorism of Francois 
Mauriac: 'We love Germany so much 
that we are glad there are two of 
them.'
The office of one of Kohl's senior 
advisers was dominated by an enor-
mously enlarged black and white
photograph of Kohl and Mitterrand 
holding hands at Verdun. A clever and 
politically sensitive photographer had 
captured the two leaders in sharp sil-
houette: an enormous Kohl and a 
much smaller Mitterrand in an 
attitude symbolizing permanent 
friendship between the two 
countries. A powerful visual image 
and statement. When the 
possibility of an East German 
visit became known, this powerful 
visual image and statement was 
quickly put into storage with the 
comment: 'They didn't really meant 
it.' Perhaps for good and sufficient
reason, the French were not in the 
forefront of Germany's Allies in wel-
coming the scarcely believable politi-
cal realities emerging beyond their 
eastern frontier. And perhaps the atti-
tudes of Britain and some other Allies 
are also understandable, even if the 
reasons were different. Mercifully the 
shadows of ambiguity they cast across 
the path of history were relatively 
short-lived.
But there were no signs of ambiguity 
in the at t i tudes of  ordinary 
Berliners. One cold morning in 
November I visited the Wall just 
behind the Reichstag, partly, I con
fess, to join the ranks of the souvenir 
hunters. I still derive pleasure from 
the memory of the sight of 'a little old 
lady' - always a special category of 
Berliner - taking her own revenge on 
this obscenity of a monument. She 
had donned her woebegone, 
old (probably pre-war), and 
unfashionably short fur coat 
and a pair of Adidas running 
shoes of more modern vintage, and 
marched defiantly up to the wall to 
confront it boldly and to contribute to 
its destruction vigorously with her 
screwdriver and hammer, humming 
quietly to herself some-
thing that sounded remarkably like 
the Ride of the Valkyries. And on that 
cold, bright morning, could anyone 
with the slightest knowledge of the 
unbelievable things that had been 
happening have argued convincingly 
that the notion of Briinnhilde and her 
horse galloping triumphantly across 
the German heavens was nothing 
more than pure Wagnerian fantasy?
Provost, Trinity College, University of 
Toronto. Mr. Delworth was Canada's 
ambassador to the Federal Republic of 
Germany from 1988 to 1992.
I still derive pleasure from the memory of the 
sight of a little old lady' - always a special 
category of Berliner - taking her own revenge on 
this obscenity of a monument... contributing! to 
its destruction vigorously with her
screwdriver and hammer, humming quietly 
to herself something that sounded
remarkably like the Ride of the Valkyries
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COMMENTARY
The Kosovo War:
A long catalogue of losers
With 20/20 hindsight it is apparent that the actions of all parties involved in the 
war in Kosovo have brought to the fore issues around humanitarianism, values, 
and consistency. Will any lessons be learned?
B Y  L O U I S  A .  D E L V O I E
I t is not uncommon for wars to pro- duce more losers than 
winners, especially wars involving 
civilian populations. This fact is, 
however, often obscured in the midst 
of the euphoria which usually marks 
the end of a war. Last year's war over 
Kosovo was no exception. With the 
benefit of a bit of hindsight, it is now 
possible to draw up a provisional list 
of the losers, and that list is 
distressingly long. It includes 
international organizations, nation 
states, and peoples, as well as 
prospects for peace, security, and sta-
bility in Europe.
T h e  N o r t h  A t l a n t i c  T r e a t y  
Organization (NATO) won a military 
victory over Serbia, but at great cost to 
its image, reputation, and future 
effectiveness as an instrument for 
change in the European security envi-
ronment. For the first fifty years of its 
existence NATO had been able to por-
tray itself quite accurately as a purely 
defensive alliance, whose military arse-
nal would be employed solely to 
defend one or more of its member 
states against aggression. On the basis 
of its historical record, the Alliance
could legitimately claim that it posed 
a threat to no one, and thus blunt the 
arguments of its opponents and critics 
around the world. That all came to an 
end with the Kosovo war. Whatever 
its other misdeeds, Serbia had not 
attacked nor threatened to attack any 
member state of NATO.  However 
noble its motives may have been, the 
fact remains that NATO launched a war 
of aggression against Serbia. This fact 
cannot be obscured by the efforts of 
N A T O  c o m m u n i q u e  w r i t e r s  t o  
describe the war euphemistically as a `
non-Article 5 crisis response opera-
tion.' In launching the war, NATO 
undermined, if it did not outright for-
feit, its claim to be a purely defensive 
alliance; in so doing it strengthened 
the hand of its many critics and 
detractors, especially in Russia.
Another institutional casualty of 
the Kosovo war was the United 
Nations (UN). Marginalized and side-
lined in the diplomacy and negotia-
tions leading up to the war, the UN 
played no part in the decision to inter-
vene militarily or in the conduct of 
operations against Serbia. This gave
the lie to the hopes and pretensions 
that  in  the  post—cold war  and 
post—Gulf War environment the UN 
would once again be able to play the 
role assigned to it by its Charter in the 
realm of international peace and secu-
rity. The fact was that the UN Security 
Council was paralysed by a standoff 
totally reminiscent of the cold war: 
the veto-wielding Western powers 
versus the veto-wielding Eastern pow-
ers. The UN ended up with no role to 
play, other than to help pick up the 
pieces by aiding refugees and con-
tributing to the reconstruction of 
Kosovo. However unjustly, this reali-
ty served to reinforce the view that the 
UN could be an effective actor only in 
those conflicts that did not engage the 
interests of the permanent members 
of the Security Council.
A third institution whose credibili-
ty was undermined by the Kosovo war 
was the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  As 
part of a ceasefire agreement conclud-
ed in October 1998, the government 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
had  agreed  to  the  dep loyment
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throughout Kosovo of international 
observers operating under the author-
ity and direction of the OSCE. Known 
as the Kosovo Verification Mission, 
the 1300 observers worked tirelessly 
to prevent outbreaks of violence, to 
re-establish local ceasefires, to negoti-
ate disengagements, and to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the victims 
on both sides of the conflict. Their 
efforts were often highly successful, 
and their very presence served to curb 
the worst excesses, since it reminded 
the belligerents that they were under 
constant scrutiny by the international 
community. The tasks of the Mission 
came to abrupt end in late March 
1999 when 19 (the NATO countries) 
of the 54 member states of the OSCE 
decided to launch military operations 
against Serbia. The OSCE, out of con-
cern for the safety of its personnel,
ordered the observers to withdraw 
from Kosovo. With their hasty, but 
orderly, withdrawal, the civilians of 
Kosovo lost the modicum of protec-
tion which their presence had provid-
ed, and the OSCE suffered a blow to its 
reputation and credibility.
Of the peoples affected by the war, 
none suffered more than the ethnic 
Albanians of Kosovo, precisely the 
people that NATO wanted to protect. 
In the months immediately preceding 
the war, the Serbian campaign against
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
and the exactions of the Serb security 
forces against the population of the 
province had produced hundreds of 
dead and thousands of displaced per-
sons. With the start of the NATO 
bombing campaign those figures 
rapidly escalated to thousands of dead 
and  hundreds  o f  t housands  o f  
refugees. Why the change? Leaving 
aside the empirically unsustainable 
proposition that a humane and mod-
erate leadership in Belgrade, imbued 
with moral scruples, had then had an 
unexplained change of heart, the sud-
den intensification of the Serbian 
campaign in Kosovo would seem 
largely attributable to the removal of 
external deterrents. One of those 
deterrents was the presence of the 
OSCE observers. Another was the 
threat of NATO bombing. It is inherent
to the concept of a deterrent that once 
it is actually used, it ceases to be a 
deterrent. That proved to be the case 
for NATO bombing in the Kosovo war; 
once actually begun, it no longer 
served as a restraint, instead it became a 
signal to the Serb leadership to unleash 
the full fury of their security forces on 
the hapless Kosovars. Even with the 
wholehearted support of the interna-
tional community, it will take Kosovo 
decades to recover from the trauma, 
dislocation, and destruction of 1999.
Although obviously not as great as 
that of the Kosovars, the suffering 
endured by the people of Serbia was 
nonetheless real and widespread. It 
certainly extended well beyond the 
families of the hundreds of Serbs killed 
as part of the 'collateral damage' done 
in the course of the NATO bombing 
campaign. The systematic destruction 
of Serbia's infrastructures and 
communications networks had an 
immediate impact on the lives of the 
people in the form of food and water 
shortages. In a longer-term 
perspective, the bombing, 
combined with a prolonged period of 
economic sanctions, will have had the 
effect of reversing much of the 
economic progress which Serbia had 
made during the second half of the 
twentieth century. The cost of repair-
ing the damage will be enormous, and 
the process will take years, especially 
since it seems most unlikely that 
Serbia will benefit from any external 
assistance so long as Slobodan 
Milokvid remains in office.
The Kosovo war also presented a 
major setback for two ambitions oft 
proclaimed by Western leaders: 
stability in the Balkans and a co-
operative framework for security 
in Europe. The war contributed to 
instability rather than stability in the 
Balkans as tens of thousands of 
Kosovar refugees inundated poor and 
poorly prepared neighbouring 
countries, often rekindling old ethnic 
tensions within and between states, 
and as Greece's unease with the 
whole NATO operat ion became 
progressively more palpable. On a 
broader canvas, the war also set back 
the prospects for creating a 'new 
security architecture' for Europe in the 
post—cold war era. Most observers and 
analysts seem to agree that such a 
scheme will require the full and whole-
hearted involvement and co-operation 
of Russia, the continent's largest, most 
populous, and militarily most power-
More serious in terms of the United States' role 
in the world was the bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade. On the one hand, the 
explanations given for the intelligence failures 
behind this mistake were reminiscent of an 
episode of the Keystone Cops.
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ful state. In attacking Serbia, one of 
Russia's oldest allies, and in bypassing 
the UN, NATO provoked widespread 
anger and condemnation in Russia, 
and not only among nationalists and 
communists,  who were already 
incensed over NATO's eastward expan-
sion to include Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic. Much time and 
skilful diplomacy will be required to 
mend fences and to get the Russian 
government back into a frame of mind 
where it is genuinely prepared to co-
operate with the West in the develop-
ment of a 'new security architecture' 
for Europe (as opposed to securing 
Russia's signature on some more or less 
meaningful document by threatening 
to withhold some credit or other from 
the International Monetary Fund).
The stature and credibility of the 
United States, as the world's one 
remaining superpower, also suffered 
as a result of the Kosovo war, particu-
larly when measured against the high-
minded rhetoric from the Clinton 
administration about war aims and its 
proud boasts about American military 
prowess. A few examples will illus-
trate the point. In its efforts to com-
pensate for inept American and 
European diplomacy in the run-up to 
the war, and to further its endeavours 
to demonize the Serbian leadership, 
the American administration chose to 
whitewash the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, which only a few weeks earlier 
had been regularly branded by the us 
intelligence community as a terrorist 
organization, heavily involved in the 
narcotics trade to finance its opera-
tions. Another example was President 
Clinton's public announcement early 
on in the war that the United States 
would not send ground troops to 
Kosovo. Although probably necessary 
to sustain domestic political support 
for the war, this statement was widely 
criticized for providing a measure of
reassurance to its Serbian adversaries 
as to what to expect. At another level, 
the statement was interpreted to mean 
that the United States was prepared to 
risk the lives of Serbs and Kosovars in 
defence of its values and ideals, but did 
not deem them sufficiently important 
to risk the life of a single American GI. 
(In a Canadian frame of reference, this 
brings to mind the old saw about 
Britain being willing to fight to the 
last, the last Australian or Canadian 
that is.)
More serious in terms of the United 
States' role in the world was the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade. On the one hand, the 
explanations given for the intelligence 
failures behind this mistake were 
reminiscent of an episode of the 
Keystone Cops. They certainly did 
not reflect well on the capabilities of a 
superpower that expends tens of 
billions of dollars on its intelligence 
establishment each year. On the 
other hand, the action itself put the 
United States on the defensive in 
its relations with China.  This  
could not  help but  adversely 
affect the position and influence of 
the United States in ongoing 
discussions with China on the 
protection of human rights and 
intellectual property, trade liberaliza-
tion, China's admission to the World 
Trade Organization (wTO), and, most 
importantly in the longer term, issues 
relating to the status of Taiwan and 
regional security in east Asia. The 
bombing of the embassy was at the 
very least a most unfortunate episode 
in what seems likely to become the 
most important and most difficult 
bilateral relationship of the first half 
of the twenty-first century.
Finally, by what they said and did 
in the Kosovo war, the governments 
of all of the major Western countries 
left themselves wide open to the 
charge of having double standards
when the Russians launched their 
offensive in Chechnya at the end of 
1999. Qualitatively there was little to 
differentiate the destruction wrought 
and the human rights abuses perpe-
trated by the Russian forces in 
Chechnya from the actions of the 
Serb forces in Kosovo. What was rad-
ically different was the response of 
Western governments to the two situ-
ations; polite diplomatic admonitions 
for the Russians, threats and bom-
bardments for the Serbs. Realism, of 
course, dictates that the West cannot 
do unto a nuclear-armed Russia what 
it did to a militarily weak rump state 
in the Balkans. And yet, since the 
actions against Serbia were largely jus-
tified on the basis of universally 
applicable principles, the West's gen-
uine adherence to those principles 
inevitably becomes rather suspect 
when they are put on the proverbial 
back burner as soon as they collide 
with harsh reality.
The debate over the Kosovo war 
will no doubt continue for years to 
come. There are many questions, to 
which no definitive answers have yet 
emerged, regarding the diplomacy 
l e a d i n g  u p  t o  t h e  w a r ,  t h e  
legality/legitimacy of NATO's military 
intervention, the conduct and effec-
tiveness of the bombing campaign, 
etc. But it may not be too early to 
suggest that there are already some 
lessons to be derived from the war, 
lessons which Western governments 
could usefully ponder in the formula-
tion of their foreign policies and the 
conduct of their diplomacy in the 
years ahead.
Louis Delvoie is Senior Fellow, 
Centre for International Relations, 
Queen 's  Univers i ty ,  Kingston,  
Ontario.
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YOUTH PERSPECTIVES
Back to the Future:
What aspiring diplomats need to know
Every year the Public Service
Commission Post-Secondary 
Recruitment Campaign for govern-
ment jobs introduces significant 
changes without notice. The autumn 
of 1999 was no exception. The affect-
ed candidates were those applying for 
Foreign Service (Fs), Management/ 
Consular ( A s )  and Development 
Officer (PM) positions.
Almost all candidates believed that 
the changes were indeed 'new' when in 
fact the campaign was - from the van-
tage point of one who has followed it 
intimately for over twenty years - a `
back-to-the-future' exercise. A look at 
how and why I arrive at that conclu-
sion may help future test-takers - as 
well as those they approach for advice.
Academic criteria
The shift to a Bachelor's degree only 
for FS candidates surprised many. 
Historically, however, this is the 
norm, not the exception. From 1928 
to 1992 a Bachelor's was the FS entry 
ticket (though aspiring diplomats 
often had advanced degrees, plus lan-
guages). The 1993 to 1998 interreg-
num, when either two degrees or one 
degree plus an exotic foreign language 
were mandatory, reflected two con-
textual issues: a buyer's market 
approach by government which took 
advantage of the situation in which 
lots of people with multiple degrees 
were chasing few jobs, and the federal 
deficit which dictated a reduction in 
the number of candidates to limit the 
per head cost of processing them.
Concerning PM eligibility criteria, the 
proliferation of degree specialties 
identified in 1999 simply verifies the 
continuing confusion shown in 
r e c r u i t i n g  b y  t h e  C a n a d i a n  
International Development Agency. 
For the record, AS academic criteria 
changed only marginally.
An unpublicized purpose for low-
ering the FS entry bar was to combat 
increasingly high attrition rates over 
the past five years among officers 
h i red  wi th  advanced academic  
degrees, specialized language skills, 
and considerable real-life experience. 
The government 's  presumption 
underlying the change was that 
younger, less highly educated people 
would be happier with the FS job, its 
potential and salary than those longer 
in the tooth. In fact, the notion is mis-
guided because abundant numbers of 
older candidates still emerged and will 
succeed in the competition. Foreign 
Affairs interviewers traditionally 
select the brightest, most mature, and 
best-performing candidates for the 
eligibility list. This often - though not 
always - disadvantages those with lit-
tle experience of any type, particularly 
when they assume, incorrectly, that 
their academic work is relevant to the 
exams and interviews, and that they 
need not prepare for a competition in 
which, typically, only one and a half 
to two per cent of candidates from 
any level are successful.
One final, important note about 
academic criteria. Despite what gov-
ernment literature and recruiters say
to FS, AS and perhaps PM candidates, 
neither degrees nor scholarly achieve-
ments are relevant in selection for an 
interview, a job, or for assignments 
and promotion after hiring. First, test 
scores (plus an affirmative action for-
mula in some cases) and, then, inter-
view performance determine hiring 
success. It was always thus.
Candidate Volume
The government's 1999 campaign 
goal was to double the number of 
candidates from last year in the FS, As 
and PM groups. This meant about 8,
000 or more were expected to apply 
for FS jobs, and about 3,000 to 4,
000 each for PM and As positions. The 
method to get the volume increase was 
to lower or broaden academic criteria, 
as described above. The back-to-the-
future benchmark for setting 
anticipated numbers: about 6,500 
applied for FS jobs in 1992 ,  
when  the  c r i t e r ion  o f  a  
Bachelor's degree only was last used.
Why the volume push? More peo-
ple stepping up to the hiring plate 
makes government work look attrac-
tive again and makes the Public 
Service Commission look effective as 
a recruiter in a time when the job 
market for grads is hot. Also, the 
higher the volume of candidates and 
the broader the range of acceptable 
academic disciplines, the greater the 
likelihood of increased participation 
by under-represented social groups, 
which attempts to address diversity 
concerns in government employment 
statistics.
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Test changes
The back-to-the-future movement was 
evident in alterations to two of the 
three tests in 1999 (the Written 
Communication or WCT test remained 
the same). The cognitive Graduate 
Recruitment Test (GRT) required for FS, 
AS, and PM candidates was tinkered 
with as usual. In place of five types of 
exercises in 80 questions, as in 1998, 
the 'new' version had four types of 
exercises in 55 questions, with a dis-
proportionately small reduction in test 
time. Not only were many of the ques-
tions the same as in 1998, several were 
the same as in 1989 and years follow-
ing when the Entry Level Officer 
Selection Test (ELOST) was used.
Why the changes? Very few fin-
ished the long, more varied 1998 
exam, and that caused cut-off scores 
that were the lowest in recent memo-
ry, possibly ever. Higher scores, and 
particularly higher passing scores 
inevitable with a pool of 4,000 to 
8,000 test takers (depending on career 
stream), will be the result from the 
1999 GRT.
As to the Foreign Service test 
required for FS candidates only, it 
underwent the biggest alteration. But 
- again - it was not as radical as inter-
preted by uninformed test-takers. The 
main change was that the old knowl-
edge-type geopolitical and policy 
questions were eliminated. (These 
had been used in one form or another 
- essay or multiple-choice or both -
since Lester Pearson was the first suc-
cessful national test recruit in 1928.) 
Instead, the 'new' Foreign Service 
Written Simulation Test (FSWST) pro-
vided four detailed, heavily nuanced, 
hypothetical situations that diplomats 
could encounter and asked candidates 
to respond, in point form, as to how 
they would deal with the scenarios.
Though new to the exam, these 
questions were fundamentally the
same as, and were graded similarily to, 
the verbal situational and role-play 
questions used for decades in the 
Foreign Service interview. Also, they 
resembled old 'judgement questions' 
which accompanied the former FS 
knowledge test in the 1970s and 
1980s. Result? Plus ca change, plus ca 
meme chose.
What prompted these changes? 
Three things. Government recruiters 
decided, arguably in the opinion of 
many current and former diplomats, 
that competency testing provides a 
better indication of job aptitude than 
knowledge testing for prospective FS 
officers. Indeed, the government has 
for years been downgrading the 
importance of international geopolit-
ical and policy knowledge in candi-
dates' cumulative (cognitive/writ-
ing/Foreign Service) test score until in 
1998 the FS exam was worth only 10 
per cent of the final total.
A second reason for change alleged 
that candidates from presumed non-
traditional academic backgrounds for 
the Foreign Service would have a bet-
ter chance of passing. This is not so, 
but another article would be needed 
to demonstrate why. The third reason 
for test changes was to prevent - hor-
ror of horrors - candidates from 
`studying' for the exam. Nonetheless, 
while ingestion of knowledge was not 
possible, or necessary, to prepare for 
the new exam, my analysis of inter-
view reports and hiring results in the 
past repeatedly proves that training on 
how to approach the situational ques-
tions, sample answers, and evaluation 
advice raises scores dramatically.
Conclusion
In 1999, the government probably 
encountered more people from differ-
ent and lower-level academic back-
grounds who knew less about the tests 
they were about to take than in recent
memory. As for candidates, more of 
them were taken aback by the 'new' 
eligibility criteria and tests sprung on 
them with little notice and less back-
ground information than ever before. 
For the benefit of those attracted to 
FS, AS, or PM careers in next year's 
Post-Secondary Campaign, a few 
words of advice. All detailed questions 
about tests should be directed not to 
local government offices/spokesper-
sons or to hastily assembled and badly 
briefed campus information teams, 
but rather to informed Ottawa-based 
co-ordinators of the campaign at the 
Public Service Commission and the 
Foreign Affairs Department where 
there is a modicum of institutional 
memory about the process and how it 
really works. Comments about the 
tests and interviews by former diplo-
mats and, occasionally, by faculty can 
be helpful, but bear in mind that peo-
ple will likely talk about their test 
experience, which was long ago, far 
away, and differently evaluated. On a 
positive note, conferring with serving 
and ex-diplomats or their family 
members can help candidates under-
stand the milieu they aspire to work in 
once the arcane vicissitudes of the 
exam, interview, eligibility, and hiring 
process are successfully negotiated.
Barry Yeates, President, Foreign 
Service Examination and Career 
Counselling Inc. Mr. Yeates, a former 
diplomat and senior university 
administrator, provides preparatory 
seminars and study materials to help 
candidates across Canada and inter-
nationally prepare for the FS, AS, and 
PM exams and interviews. Well over 
200 of his clients serve in all branches 
of the Foreign Service.
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The summer 2000 issue of International Journal
j  I  N  T E R  N A T I O N A Lourn which will be available from the CIIA in August, con-
tains the following articles: Alex Macleod,
Stephane Roussel, and Andri van Mens,
'Hobson's choice? Does Canada have any options in 
its defence and security relations with the United States?'; Xavier Furtado, 'Human security 
and Asia's financial crisis: A critique of Canadian policy'; John Stanton, 'Canada and war 
crimes: judgment at Tokyo'; Andrew Richter, "Strategic theoretical parasitism" reconsidered: 
Canadian thinking nuclear weapons and strategy, 1950-63'; Peter M. Roberts, 'Discovering 
Canada's international role in Russia's archives'; Rawdon Dalrymple, 'Indonesia in the bal-
ance'; Louis A. Delvoie, 'Canada and Italy: A steady state relationship'; Michael Szonyi, `
China: the years ahead'; Richard W. Pound, 'Performance-enhancing drugs in sport: 
Response by the international sports community'; Paul Sharp, 'Time for American to join the 
Commonwealth'; Aural Braun, 'The risks of selective Europeanization: Russia and eastern 
Europe.' Enquires to fraser@ciia.org
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